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This research explores the transient nature of Marine Corps officers serving in the 
Contingency Contracting Force and the potential link to an inability to efficiently execute 
mission requirements. Through an analysis of recent manpower structure realignment 
actions, this research assesses training, career path, and manpower deficiency 
considerations that pertain to officers serving in contracting. The reader is walked 
through this analysis via literature review discoveries, Department of Defense Inspector 
General findings, and survey feedback from senior leaders within the Marine Corps 
contracting community. These results are then analyzed through the lens of personnel, 
protocol, and platform organizational pillars using the Three Integrated Pillars of Success 
Model. 
The research effectively achieves the results desired by the established research 
objective, identifying potential root causes to problems felt within the Marine Corps 
Contingency Contracting Force officer corps that represent critical vulnerabilities within 
the overall contracting structure. The top five recommendations for the Marine Corps to 
increase the health of its contracting officer corps are presented. Additionally, future 
research considerations are presented that have the potential to further increase the 
Contingency Contracting Force’s ability to efficiently execute its mission requirements. 
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The contracting capability within the United States Marine Corps (USMC) resides 
within a high demand, low-density labor force that currently faces officer corps staffing 
deficiencies, degrading the level of contracting support provided to operational forces and 
installation activities at all levels of operations. Under USMC field contracting protocols, 
officers must rotate between contracting billets in the Contingency Contracting Force 
(CCF) and their primary military occupational specialty (PMOS) on a standard three-year 
rotation cycle in order to maintain proficiency in their PMOS and to stay competitive for 
promotions. This rotation causes a lack of continuity in an officer’s growth within the 
highly technical field of contracting, degrading experience levels and leadership 
oversight capabilities of contracting activities. Additionally, officers are not required to 
return to the contracting field upon completion of an initial tour in the CCF nor are they 
incentivized to do so. This break in continuity is not the case for enlisted Marines serving 
in the CCF as they are re-designated into a new PMOS as 3044 Contingency Contract 
Specialists upon their accession into the CCF. 
In 2015, the CCF officially underwent a realignment to achieve greater 
effectiveness and efficiencies in support provided to fleet and installation commands. The 
CCF is structured and trained to provide an operational contract support (OCS) capability 
to support the Marine Corps expeditionary mission (Department of the Navy [DON], in 
press). The focus is on the expeditionary mission, yet training and sustainment on 
garrison contracting actions lends proficiencies to the performance of the CCF. 
Additionally, contracting provides the supported commander with the benefit of having a 
robust logistics capability, overcoming shortfalls within the Department of  
Defense (DOD) organic logistical system and providing solutions to the limited space 
available to transport required supplies (United States Marine Corps [USMC], 2009). 
This robust capability can only exist when CCF professionals have the requisite 
knowledge and experience to tap into the multitude of contracting support venues that 
enable procurement of supplies and services necessary to meet mission requirements 
worldwide. The officer corps within the CCF is central to this process, ensuring the CCF 
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meets the requirements of its mission through proper training and employment of CCF 
personnel, yet the current officer structure faces critical shortfalls for the foreseeable 
future despite the efforts of the CCF realignment. These critical shortfalls have the 
potential to persist if the Marine Corps fails to identify and address root causes to 
problems that negatively impact the health of the CCF officer corps. It appears the 
Marine Corps failed to address these problems when planning the CCF realignment, and 
they will continue to plague overall CCF performance until such time that they are 
addressed. 
A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this research is to assess impacts of the CCF realignment 
relevant to the CCF officer corps, identifying potential critical vulnerabilities that exist 
under the new contracting structure employed by the Marine Corps, and to subsequently 
make recommendations for corrective actions to restore health to the CCF officer corps. 
The focus areas of interest are training, career path, and manpower deficiencies as there 
appears to be a link between these areas of interest and an inability of the CCF to execute 
its mission efficiently. 
B. SCOPE 
This research was supported by a thorough literature review, DOD Inspector 
General’s Office (IGO) report findings, solicitation of survey feedback, and an analysis 
of the CCF officer corps structure within the Marine Corps utilizing Professor E. Cory 
Yoder’s Three Integrated Pillars of Success (TIPS) Model, as identified in Phase Zero 
Contracting Operations (Yoder, Long & Nix, 2012). Use of the TIPS Model kept the 
scope of the research focused in order to dissect and define potential root causes to 
problems within the following areas as it pertains to the CCF officer corps: Personnel, 
Protocol, and Platform. Thereafter, research findings were used to assess potential critical 
vulnerabilities within the focus areas of interest. 
The analysis conducted under the personnel pillar focused on the current 
capability of the CCF officer corps to effectively and efficiently meet operating force 
requirements while determining impacts on total mission readiness. This analysis also 
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included appropriate accession pipeline considerations for officers to enter into the CCF. 
The protocol pillar included an analysis of the doctrine that establishes the entry criteria 
for officers in the CCF within all service components and the impacts associated to the 
transient nature of officers serving in Marine Corps CCF billets. The protocol pillar 
analysis also included review and recommendations for an appropriate career progression 
roadmap for officers in the CCF. Finally, the analysis of the platform pillar included a 
review of required systems access, training requirements, and an evaluation of technical 
proficiencies achieved by officers during a contracting tour. Outcomes of this analysis 
were used to reflect the detriment to the CCF when transient officers are absent for three 
years or greater. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The research attempted to meet the project objective utilizing a qualitative 
research strategy. The research started with the conduct of a thorough literature review of 
pertinent documents pertaining to the Marine Corps CCF. Of the utmost importance to 
this review, the Marine Corps is releasing a new Marine Corps Order (MCO) governing 
the CCF, which is currently undergoing final draft reviews. Thorough analysis of this 
draft document was utilized to further inform the analysis of other pertinent documents 
and regulations that govern the conduct of business in the CCF. 
Research was also conducted through case study data analysis and by using a 
survey that included multiple choice responses and short answers that were aimed at 
answering the research objective taking into consideration a variety of stakeholder 
viewpoints. The survey’s stakeholder audience consisted of a blend of field grade officers 
and senior enlisted Marines who are either currently serving in a CCF billet, or had 
previously served in the community. Qualitative analysis of case study data and survey 
responses, reconciled against literature review findings, served to strengthen the TIPS 
Model analysis yielding the resultant conclusions and recommendations for the future 
employment of officers in the CCF. 
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a brief overview of the CCF and the problems the Marine 
Corps is facing due to critical shortages of officers serving in the CCF despite contracting 
being a high demand, low density capability. The realignment efforts within the CCF 
were introduced, serving to highlight that problems appear to still exist within the CCF 
officer structure even after the realignment’s completion. Moreover, a specific objective 
was clearly defined to focus the research efforts on identifying potential critical 
vulnerabilities within the CCF structure. The scope of the research was established to 
hone in on training, career path, and manpower deficiency focus areas of interest within 
the constraints of conducting a TIPS Model analysis. The methodology defined the 
qualitative research strategy utilizing case study data, survey responses, and literature 
review findings to yield conclusions and recommendations from this research effort. 
The next chapter sets the background for research analysis by further defining 
critical aspects of the CCF. It provides foundational information surrounding the CCF to 
facilitate comprehension of data analysis. It discusses training considerations, historical 
CCF events, and manpower shortfalls. 
 5 
II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides background information instrumental to understanding the 
critical officer shortfalls discussed and analyzed within this research. It provides an 
overview of the structure and mission of the CCF and discusses past and current training 
considerations for CCF officers. It will also outline the CCF realignment actions that 
were implemented to achieve greater effectiveness and efficiencies in support of CCF 
operations. Finally, it discusses current officer shortfalls and the potential impacts they 
are having on the CCF. 
A. STRUCTURE AND MISSION 
The Contingency Contracting Officer 3006 military occupational specialty (MOS) 
is a low-density, high demand workforce specialty that resides in the Marine Corps CCF. 
The CCF is currently facing manpower deficiencies in its officer corps, potentially 
degrading support to operational forces and installation tenant commands. Aside from 
senior enlisted personnel, the senior leadership component of the CCF is comprised of its 
officers, and these officers are required to rotate in and out of CCF billets due to the 
requirement to maintain proficiency in their PMOS, and eligibility for future promotions. 
The mission of the CCF is to support the Marine Air Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF), supporting establishment, Special Operations Forces, and Joint and Supported 
Coalition Forces by planning and obtaining supplies and services from non-organic 
sources through associated contract support integration, contracting support and 
contractor management functions (DON, in press).   
B. EDUCATION 
Regarding an officers involvement in enabling the CCF mission, the Marine 
Corps has attempted several different training methods throughout the years, ranging 
from resident and non-resident education provided at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
and at the Marine Corps Combat Service Support Schools (MCCSSS) Camp Johnson, 
NC resident school house. 
 6 
1. Officer Training, Pre-2007 
During this era, Marine Corps officers were selected via the Special Education 
Program (SEP) to attend the resident NPS master degree program for Acquisition & 
Contract Management (curriculum 815) in order to obtain appropriate educational credits 
for Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) contracting certification 
(USMC, 2005). Upon graduation the officer completed a three year pay-back tour in the 
CCF before transitioning back to their PMOS. According to the NPS academic catalog,  
The Acquisition and Contract Management curriculum is an 
interdisciplinary program which integrates management theory, 
accounting, economics, finance, behavioral science, management theory, 
operations/systems analysis, and specific courses in acquisition and 
contracting. The curriculum includes a concentration option in strategic 
purchasing. (Naval Postgraduate School, 2016, p. 57) 
In August, 2006, Marine Administrative Message (MARADMIN) 373/06 was 
released announcing changes to the training of enlisted and officers serving in 
contracting, establishing a partnership with Defense Acquisition University (DAU) at the 
MCCSSS (USMC, 2006). Thereafter, MARADMIN 290/07 announced that the SEP 
selection for the 815 curriculum was eliminated (USMC, 2007). 
2. Officer Training, 2007 to 2014 
During this era, Marine Corps officers attended training at the MCCSSS in Camp 
Johnson, NC to complete a series of DAU online and resident courses. The training was 
provided over a three month period introducing the 3006 MOS to Marine Corps officers 
from the logistics, comptroller, and supply communities. The course began by having 
officers complete the basic entry-level course that all contracting professionals must 
attend, CON 090: Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Fundamentals. The DAU 
schoolhouse also provided many other Level I and Level II DAU training classes. The 
schoolhouse incorporated multiple practical exercises, adding value to the training, and 
demonstrating to students how each contracting functional area related with one another. 
In 2013, MARADMIN 593/13 announced that the DAU schoolhouse had been 
discontinued and as an interim solution, until such time a resident program could be 
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established, officers would be competitively selected to attend the NPS distance  
learning program for contract management while concurrently conducting on-the-job 
training (OJT) at Regional Contracting Offices (RCO) (USMC, 2013). 
3. Officer Training, 2014 to Present 
Beginning in 2014, officers once again attended NPS to obtain required training 
for service in contracting. As an interim solution, officers were selected to attend distance 
learning as previously stated. This solution drew upon officers from logistics, 
comptroller, and supply communities to earn a Master of Science in Contract 
Management (curriculum 835), while concurrently obtaining contracting certification 
eligibility through DAU course equivalencies (USMC, 2013). According to the NPS 
academic catalog,  
The Master of Science in Contract Management (MSCM) degree is 
designed to provide civilians in the Department of Defense (DOD) and 
other federal government agencies an advanced education in the concepts, 
methodologies and analytical techniques necessary for successful 
management of acquisition and contracting within complex organizations. 
The curriculum focuses on problem solving and decision making within 
the acquisition environment utilizing case studies, teaming exercises, 
hands-on applications, active participation, and other similar activities. 
Lecture and laboratory tasks require the application of critical thinking to 
problem solving within actual situations. Upon completion of this 
curriculum, graduates will be able to manage and lead effectively in 
systems buying offices, field contracting offices, contract administration 
offices, and contracting policy offices. (Naval Postgraduate School, 2016, 
p. 82) 
In 2014, MARADMIN 357/14 announced that supply officers would be selected 
on the Commandant’s Career-Level Education Board (CCLEB) to attend the resident 
version of the NPS contract management curriculum (USMC, 2014b). Officers 
completing the resident program owe a three year pay-back tour upon graduation in 
which they complete one year of OJT at the RCO and then complete two years of pay-
back at an Expeditionary Contracting Platoon (ECP). Despite the method of training 
received, the Marine Corps CCF still faces officer manpower shortages that are a 
potential detriment to the CCF efficiently conducting its mission. 
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C. CCF REALIGNMENT ACTIONS 
Traditionally, the Marine Corps mapped its uniformed contracting personnel to 
RCO to optimize the use of contracting Marines in support of garrison requirements and 
provide a stable training environment. Training included a combination of required DAU 
training classes coupled with experience gained while serving in an acquisitions coded 
billet for contracting professionals. While providing those advantages, mapping Marines 
to the RCOs removed the contingency contracting capability from the operational forces 
since the structure existed predominately to provide base operating support contracts 
onboard Marine Corps installations. Placing the contracting Marines in billets coded for 
the operational forces serves to protect the uniformed community from manpower cuts in 
the midst of congressionally mandated force structure drawdowns under the premise that 
Marines serving in operational contracting support functions are more critical to the 
Marine Corps. These Marines are less susceptible to manpower cuts as opposed to 
Marines serving alongside civilian personnel in a base operating support capacity. 
On 1 October 2014, the CCF realignment construct reintegrated Marine Corps 
uniform contracting personnel into the operating force (OPFOR). This action sought to 
establish a direct relationship to support warfighting functions as opposed to the garrison 
installation support model previously in use. The CCF realignment implemented an 
enterprise-wide change within the Marine Corps that affected all Marine Corps 
commands that are reliant upon contracting personnel in both the OPFOR and SE. 
Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) issued the order to restructure the CCF that 
includes the following excerpt: 
The Marine Corps’ Contingency Contracting Force (CCF) is comprised of 
154 Marines: 121 enlisted and 33 officers. Ref A thru D have realigned 
and reorganized the CCF and established new training procedures to 
develop and sustain a capable and qualified contingency contracting 
workforce that is balanced and optimized for employment within the 
operational forces and Supporting Establishment (SE). As part of the 182k 
restructuring efforts, CCF Marines unmapped to MLG headquarters (HQ) 
were moved to service company (SVCCO), headquarters regiment 
(HQTRS RGMT), MLG to align with the other LCE service functions 
effective 1 Oct 2014. The CCF realignment established an OCS capability 
that provides contract support planning and integration and contractor 
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management functions at the MARFOR and MEF, and a contracting 
support execution function at the MLG. OCS capability in the Marine 
Corps will synchronize, integrate and provide contract support to MAGTF 
and Marine Corps operational missions. (DON, in press) 
Contracting is not an initial entry-level MOS. Enlisted Marines must be an E-5 to 
enter the CCF and officers enter through a competitive selection board on the CCLEB. 
Officers screened for the CCLEB are typically in the grade of O-2 through O-3 that have 
completed a successful tour in their PMOS and have served at least three years as an 
officer prior to their screening on the CCLEB. This selection process and training method 
is in response to officer manpower deficiencies historically faced by the CCF. 
D. CCF OFFICER DEFICIENCIES 
To correct critical deficiencies in manpower, the CCF realignment implemented 
an interim solution to fill the gap created by not having an adequate commissioned officer 
presence within the CCF. This interim solution placed officers as additional manpower 
inside of RCOs while they completed their NPS requirements. Parallel to the interim 
solution, the Marine Corps also implemented a long-term solution which screens 
applicants to attend the 18 month resident contracting master degree program at NPS, and 
subsequently be assigned to an installation RCO upon graduation. The current training 
structure for officers has increased the entry-level officer corps for contracting, but 
considering the 18–24 month training intervals the benefits derived from this interim and 
long-term set of solutions are unlikely to be realized for several years. In fact, current 
gaps in officer billets for senior grades have created greater capability deficiencies in 
CCF manpower readiness through the loss of their experience despite the Marine Corps 
attempting to close deficiency gaps by increasing the number of qualified officers who 
are entering the CCF but lack contracting experience. 
While this interim solution focused on training, the CCF realignment as a whole 
potentially did not address a critical vulnerability resident in the CCF by making the 
Contingency Contracting Officer a PMOS for Marine officers, as opposed to an 
additional MOS (AMOS). The AMOS assignment as opposed to PMOS causes the 
officer to remain transient in the field as they must return to their PMOS to remain 
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competitive for promotion. Furthermore, the CCF realignment’s long-term solution is to 
send officers resident to NPS while restricting the eligible specialties that can become a 
3006 to only supply officers as a necessary MOS (NMOS). This action has created 
additional vulnerabilities in the breadth, continuity, and retention of qualified officer 
talent, leadership, and experience within the CCF which potentially degrades the CCF’s 
ability to efficiently complete its mission. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided background surrounding significant manpower shortfalls in 
CCF officers. These shortfalls result from a highly specialized and lengthy training 
curriculum coupled with an impermanent MOS structure. Impermanence causes officers 
to rotate out of contracting billets after single tours leaving a very narrow community 
from which the Marine Corps can draw upon to fill CCF officer billets, often leaving 
senior contracting billets vacant or filled by officers not possessing the requisite 
experience. The Marine Corps has attempted multiple training methods to increase the 
throughput of its CCF officer corps, including 18–24 month resident and non-resident 
graduate degree programs, as well as a three month schoolhouse combined with OJT 
instruction at installation contracting activities. 
The current realignment actions for the CCF workforce are a result of protecting 
the MOS from potential manpower cuts during a period of congressionally mandated 
force drawdowns. This effort sought to establish a direct relationship between uniformed 
contracting personnel providing support to Marine OPFORs as opposed to base operating 
support functions commonly viewed as being more prone to manpower cuts. Officers 
entering the CCF are selected on the CCLEB following a successful tour in their PMOS. 
These Marines have typically served as an officer at least three years and are of the grade 
O-2 through O-3. Once selected on the CCLEB these officers report to NPS for an 18 
month resident graduate program in contract management for follow on assignment to an 
installation contracting activity for OJT instruction. 
The highly specialized career field combined with the lengthy training curriculum 
and impermanent officer assignment has created significant officer manpower shortfalls 
 11 
in the CCF. The Marine Corps has attempted to address these manpower shortfalls by 
increasing the throughput of officers into contracting through incentivizing officers with 
a master degree. The long-term benefit of the increased officer presence is not likely to be 
realized by the Marine Corps for several years, since the additional officers entering the 
CCF must return to their PMOS following the completion of their entry-level tour. The 
Marine Corps has attempted to address the continuity of its officer corps in the CCF by 
confining the MOS exclusively to supply officers as a NMOS, but the benefits of this 
action will also take several years to develop. Also, the consequences from limiting entry 
into the CCF officer corps to supply officers only will potentially create additional 
weaknesses in the breadth, talent, and leadership abilities of the CCF officer corps. These 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A comprehensive review of literature pertinent to the CCF was critical to 
understanding the implications of the CCF realignment on the CCF officer corps. 
Additionally, the review fostered a greater understanding of the contents that are being 
written into the new MCO that is currently undergoing final revisions before being signed 
into effect. The literature review began with a thorough analysis of directives, doctrine, 
and studies pertaining to the field of contracting and to potential contingency contracting 
officer feeder MOSs such as supply, comptrollers, and logistics. Upon cementing a 
foundational understanding of these documents, the literature review focused on 
analyzing messages that effectively implemented the CCF realignment actions, published 
via MARADMINs. Lastly, utilizing accrued knowledge from previously reviewed 
literature, the draft MCO contents were thoroughly analyzed and assessed for 
implications that pertain to officers entering into and currently serving in the CCF. 
Upon commencing the literature review, documents were classified into three 
main categories: Directives, Doctrine, and Studies; Implementation Messages; and Draft 
MCO. This chapter provides an overview of significant sources within the three 
classifications. Sources are linked to officers serving in the CCF, driving the analysis and 
conclusions of this project. 
A. DIRECTIVES, DOCTRINE, AND STUDIES 
1. Contingency Contracting (Marine Corps Reference Publication 4-11E)  
This document is a Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) that articulates 
doctrinal practices within contingency contracting on a level that is understood by all 
entities interacting with and supported by CCF personnel. MCRP 4-11E, Contingency 
Contracting, details the importance of the two types of authority that affect Marines 
serving in the CCF: command authority and contracting authority. CCF officer oversight 
and interface with key leadership is critical for ensuring these two authorities are not 
crossed during contracting operations, particularly when the assigned contracting officer 
(KO) is an enlisted Marine serving under officers of the supported command. This 
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document establishes functional and command and control relationships as it pertains to 
contracting. Additionally, this document emphasized the importance of the role of 
officers serving as OCS advisors and the role they play as staff planners in service to the 
supported commander. This document is important because it informs the research 
knowledge base by detailing the workings of critical interrelationships that must exist in 
order for the CCF to provide effective and efficient contracting support to the Marine 
Corps (2009). 
2. Military Contractors: How Earlier Integration in the Planning Process 
Would Achieve Greater Mission Success 
This document is a Naval War College research report that emphasizes the 
importance of military contractor inclusion during requirements planning for achieving 
successful mission accomplishment in supported operations. The Naval War College 
research report fostered an understanding of the importance of retaining experienced, 
well-qualified officers in the CCF. It provided a link to officers serving in an OCS 
capacity and their important role in the administration of the Adaptive Planning and 
Execution System (APEX) platform in the model of the Joint Operational Planning 
Process, which ultimately informs the operational order Annex W, OCS. Additionally, 
this report fostered creativity in the recommendations presented in this research, such as 
top secret security clearances as incentives to retain well-qualified senior officers. This 
document is important because it informs the research knowledge base by demonstrating 
the need for thorough integrated planning in contracting for mission requirements, 
accenting the CCF’s need to incentivize officers to serve in CCF billets to facilitate this 
complex form of planning, particularly at the operational and strategic levels of war. 
3. Supply Administration and Operations Training and Readiness Manual 
(NAVMC 3500.64B) 
This document is the Training and Readiness (T&R) manual that establishes 
Marine Corps required training standards for Marines serving in the Supply and 
Contracting occupational fields in order to accomplish Marine Corps Mission Essential 
Tasks (MET). Chapter 6 of the T&R provides the link between T&R events and 
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standards expected of an officer serving in the 3006 MOS, and the Individual 
Development Plan (IDP) and Contracting Competency Model (CCM) included as 
appendices to the draft MCO. Officers are expected to train to these standards. Moreover, 
officers are expected to sustain these standards, which has the potential to become a 
critical deficiency as the officer transitions between contracting and their PMOS. It is 
important to note, this document does not delineate the additional requirements for CCF 
personnel to obtain and sustain DAWIA KO certifications. These training requirements 
are in addition to T&R training standards, and required in order to obtain a contracting 
warrant; however, commonalities do exist. Serving in a field governed by ever-changing 
FAR regulations, system variations between Continental United States (CONUS) and 
Outside Continental United States (OCONUS) contracting venues, and changes and 
updates to system interfaces requires the officer to continuously adapt and learn while 
serving in the CCF. Ongoing changes that occur during the period the officer is not 
serving in the CCF appears to be linked to problems associated with meeting T&R 
standards. Ultimately, this document is important because it informs the research 
knowledge base by clearly defining the training the Marine Corps expects CCF officers 
to successfully complete and sustain in order for the Marine Corps to accomplish METs 
(DON, 2014a). 
4. Contracting Positions: Qualification Requirements (10 U.S. Code § 
1724) 
The qualification requirements necessary to serve in the CCF are codified in  
10 U.S. Code § 1724. The standards set forth in this law govern how an officer must be 
trained to enter into and serve in the field of contracting. These qualification requirements 
inform necessary accession pipeline considerations that the Marine Corps must adhere to 
when populating its CCF officer corps. The requirements also play into the incentives 
that officers could receive to enter into and remain serving in contracting, as Marine 
officers are not required to have business related degrees to commission as officers in the 
Marine Corps, but 10 U.S. Code § 1724 requires they possess 24 business-related credits 
to serve in the CCF. This document is important because it informs the research 
knowledge base by clearly establishing who is eligible to serve in the CCF, further 
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establishing necessary accession pipeline lead-time considerations for training an entry-
level officer to officially enter into the CCF (10 U.S. § Code 1724, 2011). 
5. Operational Contract Support (Joint Publication 4-10) 
This Joint Publication (JP) introduces the joint commander to OCS, defining roles 
and responsibilities for OCS. Furthermore, JP 4-10 provides the joint doctrine for actual 
employment of OCS support in operations to effectively and efficiently meet 
requirements dictated by the mission. This document provides a link to the Marine Corps’ 
ability to provide well-qualified CCF officers as OCS advisors in support of the crucial 
functions of the Operational Contract Support Integration Cell, as well as the Operational 
Contracting Oversight Cell (OCOC) established in the Marine Expeditionary Force 
(MEF) G-4 during large-scale operations in support of the Ground Combatant 
Commander (GCC). At this echelon of operations and complexities, CCF officers with 
increased levels of contracting experience are needed to clearly articulate  
contracting requirements that may have far-reaching impacts within the GCC’s area of 
responsibility (AOR). This document is important because it informs the research 
knowledge base by demonstrating the shear importance of the Marine Corps maintaining 
an experienced, well-qualified CCF officer corps to reinforce its support provided in 
joint, large-scale operational environments governed by GCCs, ultimately increasing the 
relevance of the Marine Corps and its contracting capability in support of expeditionary 
operations (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014). 
6. Military Occupational Specialties Manual (NAVMC 1200.1A W/CH1) 
This document is also known as the “MOS Manual,” and it provides a capability 
description pertaining to the 3006 MOS and explains working relationships with other 
MOS fields in the Marine Corps. The MOS Manual also provides insights to appropriate 
accession pipeline considerations for the CCF, such as appropriate feeder MOSs into the 
field of contracting. It explains the interrelationships that exist between the contracting, 
comptroller, and supply communities, and provides the overall description of what an 
officer possessing the 3006 MOS is supposed to be able to do for the Marine Corps. This 
document is important because it informs the research knowledge base of HQMC 
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expectations of its CCF officer corps, and it demonstrates how supply officers, 
comptrollers, and even logistics officers may be the best suited communities from which 
to competitively select officers to serve in the CCF due to their intimate working 
relationships with the contracting community (DON, 2015a). 
7. Consumer-Level Supply Policy (Marine Corps Order 4400.150) 
This document is the MCO that governs supply operations within the Marine 
Corps, defining functional area responsibilities and stressing the requirement for asset 
accountability and legal funds expenditure. MCO 4400.150 provides the clear link 
between supply officers and contracting, and further suggests supply officers as an 
appropriate feeder MOS into contracting. As one example, supply officers typically serve 
as Approving Officials (AO) for a Commanding Officer’s Government-wide Commercial 
Purchase Card (GCPC) program, where they are required to appropriately vet mandatory 
sources of supplies and services before establishing contracts under the micro-purchase 
threshold. This level of knowledge and intimacy with contracting, in addition to building 
and submitting required purchase request (PR) documentation to contracting for unit 
requirements, presumably make the supply officer the ideal candidate to become a 3006. 
This document is important because it informs the research knowledge base of a supply 
officer’s duty requirements that are associated with contracting, informing 
recommendations and conclusions pertaining to appropriate feeder MOS considerations 
(DON, 2014c). 
8. Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform-2015 Update 
(DoDIG-2015-101) 
This document is part of a series of update reports regarding contingency 
contracting reform initiatives and summarizes multiple contingency contracting 
investigations. In 2010 the DOD IGO conducted an inspection of reports regarding 
contracts in a contingency environment. The findings of the investigation were significant 
enough that they made the summary report a reoccurring deliverable every two years. 
This report is the third such report and captures some data from the previous two. The 
report highlights negative trends in contingency contracting, suggests causes for the 
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findings, and assesses unit actions in implementing the recommendations provided in the 
original report. This document is important because it informs the research knowledge 
base about systemic problem areas present throughout DOD contingency contracting 
activities that potentially identify CCF critical vulnerabilities (2015). 
B. IMPLEMENTATION MESSAGES 
1. Contingency Contracting Officer (AMOS 3006) Sourcing and Education 
(MARADMIN 283/14) 
MARADMIN 283/14 announced the new 3006 sourcing initiative, making 3006 a 
NMOS for supply officers. Furthermore, it announced the cancellation of the DAU 
schoolhouse located at Camp Johnson, NC and that the Marine Corps would be once 
again sending its officers through contracting training at the NPS. This MARADMIN 
also established an interim solution for officers to attend NPS in a distance learning status 
while simultaneously conducting OJT at a RCO. This document is important because it 
informs the research knowledge base by demonstrating that the Marine Corps is 
concerned about the quality and level of education its CCF officer corps receives upon 
entry into contracting. Furthermore, it clearly establishes supply officers as a feeder MOS 
into contracting by denoting 3006 as a NMOS, which adds additional credibility to a 
supply officer’s Official Military Personnel File when looked at for future promotion 
considerations (USMC, 2014). 
2. FY15 Contingency Contracting Officer (AMOS 3006) Solicitation 
(MARADMIN 043/15) 
MARADMIN 043/15 was a solicitation for officer applicants to apply into the 
contracting field. It gave preference to supply officers; however, comptrollers, logistics 
officers, and aviation supply officers were given an opportunity to apply in the instance 
seats remained available after all supply officer packages had been evaluated. The 
availability made to MOSs other than supply officers suggests that the Marine Corps may 
be willing to consider other appropriate feeder MOSs into contracting, potentially feeding 
recommendations made as a result of this project. This document is important because it 
informs the research knowledge base of other potential feeder MOSs for entry into the 
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CCF officer corps, and it denotes that officer applicants should be competitively selected 
via an accession board to ensure the quality of the CCF officer corps (USMC, 2015a). 
3. Establishing Operational Contract Support Capability in Support of 
MAGTF Operations (MARADMIN 122/15) 
MARADMIN 122/15 established that 3006 selection would happen on the 
CCLEB. Selection on the CCLEB is limited to Supply Officers only, which may serve to 
inform recommendations this research makes about appropriate feeder MOSs. 
Additionally, the MARADMIN acknowledged that CCF billets would be gapped for the 
foreseeable future as the Marine Corps continues to make the change in officer selection 
and assignment to the CCF, and that existing 3006s may be drawn upon to support the 
CCF during the transition. The MARADMIN also emphasized command and control of 
officers serving as warranted KOs via the ECPs established in the Marine Logistics 
Groups (MLG), reiterating the impacts of the CCF realignment. Finally, the 
MARADMIN also specified OCS as a function of logistics and that the capability resides 
in the G-4 coded staff sections of Marine Corps Forces (MARFORs) and MEFs. This 
document is important because it informs the research knowledge base of accession 
pipeline protocols. Additionally, it notes that critical shortfalls exist and may persist for 
the foreseeable future which draws attention to further analysis into potential root causes 
for such critical shortfalls. Lastly, this document delineates particular command and 
control relationships for the employment of CCF officers serving in billets as warranted 
KOs and as OCS advisors (USMC, 2015a). 
4. U.S. Marine Corps Contractual Services Guidance for Fiscal Year 2016 
(MARADMIN 441/15) 
MARADMIN 441/15 required commanders to establish Service Requirements 
Review Boards (SRRB) for review and approval of PRs for services, with validation 
authority established no lower than first General Officer or Senior Executive Service 
level. The necessity of this review is linked to the complexity involved in defining, 
awarding, and managing service requirements contracts. This research could attempt to 
link this increased complexity to the need for well-qualified officers to manage the SRRB 
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process and lend their expertise to garrison and expeditionary contracting activities. This 
document is important because it informs the research knowledge base of the requirement 
to conduct SRRBs, which implies the need for experienced and well-qualified senior 
leaders, particularly CCF officers, to manage the conduct of these boards. Being that the 
nature of service contracts tends to be more complex than that of supply contracts, there 
may also be a link to appropriate training and manpower staffing considerations to ensure 
SRRBs are appropriately staffed (USMC, 2015b). 
C. DRAFT MCO 
The Marine Corps is still in the process of editing the final draft of a new MCO 
governing the CCF. During the literature review, a copy of the draft MCO was obtained 
and thoroughly reviewed. The draft MCO was the primary focus of this research 
literature review, as it will ultimately become the principle enforcement mechanism for 
appropriate CCF employment when it is signed into effect. The order discusses all facets 
that will govern the CCF (e.g., annual capability assessments, CCF billet rotations back 
to PMOS, and fitness report (FITREP) performance evaluation procedures for Marines 
serving in the CCF). This document is important because it informs the research 
knowledge base of the Marine Corps’ intent for employment of its CCF throughout all 
Marine Corps organizational hierarchies. Additionally, it discusses information pertinent 
to informing the focus areas of interest for this research: training, career path, and 
manpower deficiencies. The draft MCO will provide the basis of comparison for analysis, 
recommendations, and conclusions within this research, serving as the overarching 
document of reference throughout the conduct of research efforts (DON, in press). 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
A comprehensive review of literature pertinent to the CCF was critical to 
assessing and understanding impacts of the CCF realignment relevant to the CCF officer 
corps. This chapter provided an overview of significant sources of information within 
three established documentation classifications that influenced the research herein. The 
literature reviewed is foundational for the TIPS Model analysis of the CCF and served to 
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form the questions posed in the research survey in order to obtain stakeholder viewpoints 
of potential problems plaguing the CCF officer corps. 
The directives, doctrine, and studies provided insight into how the Marine Corps 
attempts to staff and employ its CCF to efficiently conduct its mission. Critical 
manpower shortfalls and studies suggest inefficiencies may exist. The implementation 
messages discussed the actions the Marine Corps took during the CCF realignment in an 
attempt to improve efficiencies. Lastly, the Marine Corps is in the process of editing a 
draft MCO that will ultimately serve as the enforcement mechanism for CCF 
employment. Due to the imminent effectiveness of this order, this research uses the draft 
MCO as the overarching document of reference throughout the conduct of the research. 
Next, data from the studies discussed in the literature review, and the research 
survey responses are presented to inform later discussion and analysis related to the 
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IV. DATA 
This chapter presents raw data collected from the DOD IGO report discussed in 
the literature review, manpower data from HQMC Installations and Logistics (I&L) 
Logistics Policy and Capabilities Branch (LPC), and tabulated survey responses from a 
survey solicited in support of this research effort. The chapter will also include a 
description of the survey design, focus areas, and process. The survey solicited input 
from senior enlisted Marines and field grade Marine officers that are serving in, or have 
previously served in, the Marine Corps contracting community. The survey questions 
were designed around the research objective of this paper to determine contracting 
community perceptions of the selection, training, employment, and retention of CCF 
officers, as well as potential critical vulnerabilities of the CCF. All of the data presented 
in Chapter IV will be discussed and analyzed in Chapter V. 
A. TOP FIVE SYSTEMIC CONTRACTING PROBLEM AREAS 
In 2015, the DOD IGO released DOD IGO Report DODIG-2015-101. Table 1 
contains statistical information from this DOD IGO report. Table 1 also contains data 
obtained from two past DOD IGO summary reports (D-2010-059 and DODIG-2012-
134). Collectively, the three summary reports depicted in the table analyzed contingency 
contracting problems that the DOD IGO investigated over a seven-year span of time, as 
the 2010 report data stemmed from as far back as 2007. DODIG-2015-101 stated: “DOD 
IG[O] consistently identified a total of nine systemic problems in all three summary 
reports” (2015, p. 4). The nine identified problem areas are oversight and surveillance; 
requirements; property accountability; financial management; contract pricing; source 
selection; contract documentation; contract type; and contractor personnel. Table 1 
depicts the top five problems identified, ranking them in order of severity, and identifies 
the number of reports contained in each problem area. The number of reports are further 
divided into the number of occurrences identified per summary report. Though not 
specific to the Marine Corps, this data depicts negative trends throughout DOD 
contingency contracting. The data will facilitate the assessment and relationship of DOD 
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IGO findings as compared to current critical vulnerabilities specific to the Marine Corps 
CCF. 
Table 1.   Top Five Systemic Contracting Problem Areas.  
Source: DOD (2015) 
 
 
B. APRIL 2016 3006 MOS BILLETS AND VACANCIES 
HQMC I&L, LPC serves as the occupational field sponsor for 3006 Marines. As 
such, they are responsible for tracking and filling 3006 billets. Table 2 includes the 3006 
billets and vacancies as they were at the start of April 2016. Analysis of this data should 
provide additional insight into critical vulnerabilities that may exist within manpower 
considerations. It should also reveal how the Marine Corps is currently spreading the  
loading its CCF officer corps to accomplish its mission. Names have been redacted from 
the source document to remove personally identifiable information, and vacant billets 




Table 2.   April 2016 3006 MOS Billets and Vacancies. 
Adapted from Navarro (2016). 
Billets Rank Current Fill (2016) 
HQMC LtCol LtCol (redacted) 
HQMC Maj Vacant 
MARFORPAC Maj Maj (redacted) 
MARCENT Maj Maj (redacted) 
MARSOC LtCol LtCol (redacted) 
MARFORAF/EUR Maj Maj (redacted) 
MARFORSOUTH Maj Vacant 
MARFORRES (NOLA) Capt Capt (redacted) 
I MEF Maj LtCol (redacted) 
II MEF Maj Vacant 
III MEF Maj Capt (redacted) 
1st MLG CCO LtCol Capt (redacted) 
1st MLG Capt Capt (redacted) 
1st MLG Capt Capt (redacted) 
1st MLG Capt Capt (redacted) 
2nd MLG CCO Maj Vacant 
2nd MLG Capt Capt (redacted) 
2nd MLG Capt Capt (redacted) 
2nd MLG  Capt Capt (redacted) 
3rd MLG CCO LtCol Maj (redacted) 
3rd MLG Capt Vacant 
3rd MLG Capt Vacant 
DPRI/MARFORPAC Capt Vacant 
MCI West Director RCO LtCol LtCol (redacted) 
MCI EAST Director RCO LtCol LtCol (redacted) 
MCB QUANTICO Director RCO Col LtCol (redacted) 
MCB QUANTICO Capt Capt (redacted) 
MCIPAC Director RCO  Maj LtCol (redacted) 
MCIPAC Camp Butler Capt Vacant 
MCB HAWAII DIRECTOR RCO Maj LtCol (redacted) 
LOGCOM Capt Capt (redacted) 
PISC Capt Capt (redacted) 
29 Palms Capt Vacant 
Note: Vacant billets are highlighted. 
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C. SURVEY  
1. Survey Design and Focus Areas  
The survey was constructed and aimed at answering the research objective 
through identification of CCF officer corps employment considerations from the 
viewpoints of relevant stakeholders. The survey’s stakeholder audience consisted of field 
grade officers (Major and Lieutenant Colonel) and senior enlisted Marines (Master 
Sergeant and Master Gunnery Sergeant) who were either currently serving in a CCF 
billet, or had previously served in the contracting community. The survey contained 
seven multiple choice questions including one question to identify if the respondent was 
serving (served as) as an officer or enlisted. All questions, with the exception of number 
one, included an optional comment box for the respondent to provide additional remarks. 
2. Survey Process  
The survey was disseminated through the NPS LimeSurvey tool. All participants 
were screened based upon the eligibility criteria of grade and contracting MOS 
assignment. Personnel meeting the eligibility criteria received an email requesting 
participation in the survey from the token management tool in LimeSurvey. Surveys were 
made available for 15 days from receipt of the invitation, and participants received a 
reminder email seven days prior to the survey expiration. Survey participation was 
voluntary, anonymous, and estimated to take no more than 10 minutes to complete. 
3. Survey Results  
The survey was provided to a total of 37 personnel. This survey population is 
extremely small due to the small population of senior officer and enlisted Marines in the 
CCF, with only 37 personnel currently available to solicit input from. From the 37 
personnel solicited, 21 provided a response yielding a 58 percent response rate. Results 
from each survey question are provided in the following sub-sections. 
Question 1:  I am serving as or previously served as: [officer or enlisted] 
Of the 21 survey participants, 11 were enlisted service members and the 
remaining 10 were officers, as visually depicted in Figure 1. All participants were serving 
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on active duty in the Marine Corps at the time of the survey. The survey did not query the 
specific rank of each participant, but the survey was designed so that all enlisted 
participants were E-8 select or above who carry the 3044 MOS of Contingency Contract 
Specialist. Officer participants were at the rank of O-4 select or above that had completed 
at least one assignment as a 3006 Contingency Contracting Officer. Officer participants 
were a mix of personnel that currently serve in a 3006 billet assignment or a billet in their 
PMOSs. 
Figure 1.  Question 1 Survey Response Chart 
 
The purpose of this question is merely to break down the respondent population to 
identify any anomalies that are particular to officers or enlisted personnel. 
Question 2: Does your command have a reintegration period for commissioned 
officers returning to the contracting MOS for a subsequent tour before they are 
able to deploy?  If yes, what training is required? 
All survey participants unanimously selected no in response to question two, as 
visually depicted in Figure 2. Three survey respondents also provided additional 
comments. These comments were in reference to the lack of formalized reintegration 
11 
10 
A. Enlisted B. Officer
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training for officers returning to contracting for subsequent tours, and they remarked that 
such a training program should be developed due to the highly technical and frequently 
changing regulations that govern contracting operations. 
Figure 2.  Question 2 Survey Response Chart 
 
This question was designed to help identify whether or not CCF units are 
currently implementing reintegration training in order to refresh returning 3006 
capabilities lost through skill atrophy, as well as to familiarize these officers with up-to-
date federal and local regulations, policy, and directives. 
In the following sub-section, questions 3, 4, and 5 are presented collectively as 
these questions essentially queried the same information, but specifically as it pertains to 






A. Yes B. No
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Questions 3, 4, & 5: Upon completion of OJT [for Captains], what role could 
commissioned officers [3: Captain, 4: Major, 5: Lieutenant Colonel] have in the 
contracting community throughout their career progression?  Please select all 
that apply. 
Questions three, four, and five presented the same question to participants with 
identical multiple choice options, and the variation in officer rank served as the only 
independent variable. Results are summarized in Table 3 with the highest percent “yes” 
and “no” responses highlighted in yellow and red, respectively, as they pertain to each 
rank. 
Table 3.   Questions 3–5 Survey Response 
Role Response Capt Maj LtCol 
  Qty % Qty % Qty % 
a. OCS advisor 
No 11 52% 2 10% 1 5% 
Yes 10 48% 19 90% 20 95% 
b. Writing contracts 
No 2 10% 7 33% 13 62% 
Yes 19 90% 14 67% 8 38% 
c. Awarding contracts (warrant) 
No 4 19% 1 5% 6 29% 
Yes 17 81% 20 95% 15 71% 
d. Contracting activity OIC 
No 11 52% 2 10% 0 0% 
Yes 10 48% 19 90% 21 100% 
e. Acquisitions Command Billet 
No 20 95% 16 76% 7 33% 
Yes 1 5% 5 24% 14 67% 
f. Other/Comments 
Yes 2 responses 2 responses 3 responses 
Reference Chapter V to view responses 
Table Legend Highest Percent Yes Highest Percent No 
 
Data from this question will be analyzed to identify potential roles best-suited for 
CCF officers (applicable to each rank), serving to further inform recommendations and 
conclusions derived from the research. 
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Question 6: Which of the following are documented as critical vulnerabilities 
that affect the mission readiness for contracting?  Please select all that apply. 
Question 6 sought to identify areas of the most risk/weakness, also referred to as 
critical vulnerabilities, influencing the Marine Corps CCF’s ability to efficiently execute 
its mission. Survey participants were provided 10 multiple-choice options to select from, 
as well as an option to identify other critical vulnerabilities not provided. Survey 
responses to this question are depicted in Table 4, with the highest percent yes and no 
responses highlighted in yellow and red, respectively. 
Table 4.   Question 6 Survey Response 
Critical Vulnerability Response Qty % 
a. Impermanent officer assignment No 5 24% 
Yes 16 76% 
b. Officer manpower shortfalls No 0 0% 
Yes 21 100% 
c. Enlisted manpower shortfalls No 10 48% 
Yes 11 52% 
d. GS manpower shortfalls No 15 71% 
Yes 6 29% 
e. Officer’s technical proficiency No 4 19% 
Yes 17 81% 
f. Failure of contract administration/oversight No 11 52% 
Yes 10 48% 
g. Lack of customer understanding of the 
contracting processes 
No 5 24% 
Yes 16 76% 
h. Systems synchronization for OCONUS to 
CONUS contracts 
No 14 67% 
Yes 7 33% 
i. Knowledge of systems usage No 12 57% 
Yes 9 43% 
j. Lost knowledge from retiring contracting 
personnel 
No 10 48% 
Yes 11 52% 
k. Other/Comments 
Yes 5 responses 
Reference Chapter V to view 
responses 
Table Legend Highest Percent Yes Highest Percent No 
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This question extracts the perceived critical vulnerabilities within the CCF from 
the perspective of the Marines who have or are currently serving in CCF billets. The data 
from this question will be analyzed to assess any inconsistencies between perceived 
vulnerabilities and substantiated vulnerabilities found through this research. 
Question 7: What incentives (if any) could be offered to support retention of 
commissioned officers in the contracting community? Please select all that 
apply. 
Question 7 sought to identify appropriate methods to retain and incentivize 
experienced, well-qualified commissioned officers for subsequent tours of service in the 
CCF. Survey participants were provided multiple choice options to select from, as well as 
an option to identify other retention incentives not provided in the question. Survey 
responses to this question are depicted in Table 5 with the highest percent yes and no 
responses highlighted in yellow and red, respectively. 
Table 5.   Question 7 Survey Response 
Retention Incentive Response Qty % 
a. DOD funded graduate degree programs 
No 6 29% 
Yes 15 71% 
b. PME equivalencies for AMOS 
assignment 
No 16 76% 
Yes 5 24% 
c. Command billet opportunities aligned 
with the acquisitions MOS (8061) 
No 8 38% 
Yes 13 62% 
d. Special duty pay to incentivize retention 
No 15 71% 
Yes 6 29% 
e. None 
No 20 95% 
Yes 1 5% 
f. Other/Comments 
Yes 5 responses 
Reference Chapter V to view responses 
Table Legend Highest Percent Yes Highest Percent No 
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The data from this question will be analyzed to assess and develop 
recommendations that may potentially incentivize officers to desire subsequent tours in 
the CCF opposed to pursuing non-contracting related billets, or separating from service in 
the Marine Corps. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented raw data collected from DOD IGO studies; manpower data 
from HQMC I&L, LPC; and data captured via the research survey solicited to appropriate 
members serving in, or having previously served in the CCF. The chapter also provided a 
description of the survey design, focus areas, and process. Data was presented in figures 
and tables to aid the reader’s understanding of the information obtained. The data 
presented will be used to conduct deeper discussion and analysis in Chapter V, better 
informing resultant recommendations and conclusions pertaining to the research 
objective. 
Next, data presented in Chapter IV will be thoroughly analyzed and discussed, 
defining its implications as it pertains to the CCF officer corps. Following this analysis 
and discussion, insights obtained will feed the follow-on use of the TIPS Model, which 
will be utilized to conduct deeper analysis within the constraints of the Personnel, 
Protocol, and Platform pillars of the CCF officer corps.  
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V. DISCUSSIONS AND ANALYSIS 
Chapter V begins discussion and analysis at the macro level by looking into 
systemic contingency contracting problems that the DOD is facing, and relating their 
relevance to CCF critical vulnerabilities. The chapter then transitions towards a micro-
level approach, examining data from the current CCF officer corps billet structure and 
assignments. Next, the perception that senior CCF leadership has regarding 3006s is 
analyzed from the results obtained from survey respondents. Findings from these three 
research areas are then applied to analysis conducted utilizing the TIPS Model, assessing 
the overall health of the CCF officer corps within the personnel, protocol, and platform 
pillars. 
A. TOP FIVE SYSTEMIC CONTRACTING PROBLEM AREAS 
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS  
To establish a methodical approach to analyzing the systemic problems presented 
in Table 1, this sub-section will first look at which of the systemic problems within DOD-
wide contingency contracting are also commonly found in within the CCF. Those 
problem areas shared by the CCF are further analyzed utilizing Table 1 to see whether the 
DOD experienced an improvement or regression in performance under each problem area 
between reporting periods. When reviewing the number of reports identified under each 
problem area, and analyzing how they change between the three distinct summary reports 
depicted in Table 1, the data can be utilized to assess trends and recommendation 
effectiveness within the overall DOD contingency contracting field. A decline in findings 
between summary reports suggests DOD IGO recommendations at the time were both 
appropriate and effective. A consistent or increasing number of findings between 
summary reports suggests DOD IGO recommendations at the time were not adhered to or 
ineffective. Areas with potentially sound recommendations may warrant further 
investigation into their effectiveness, assessing whether or not the Marine Corps should 
incorporate them into CCF operations. 
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The top five systemic problems listed in Table 1 are Oversight and Surveillance, 
Property Accountability, Requirements, Financial Management, and Contract 
Documentation. Of the top five systemic contracting problem areas, four can be directly 
linked to manpower shortfalls and training deficiencies present in the CCF. The one 
problem area not directly linked to manpower shortfalls and training deficiencies is 
Financial Management, which focused on violations of the Antideficiency Act, Bona 
Fide Needs Rule, and Misappropriation Act. While a lack of training and education can 
attribute to a portion of this problem area, Financial Management is not recognized as a 
negative trend within the CCF, and is not analyzed further in this study. In the following 
sub-sections each of the remaining four systemic problem areas are discussed and 
analyzed. 
• Oversight and Surveillance 
Oversight and Surveillance is ranked as the most egregious problem area with 75 
total reports identified. There are over 40 more reports with discrepancies in Oversight 
and Surveillance than there are reports in the second largest problem area. The 2015 
summary report classifies Oversight and Surveillance problems into six categories. Four 
of the six categories are directly relevant to the CCF, which include training and 
certification, contracting officer, contracting officer representative (COR), and 
insufficient staff (2015). Of these four categories, training and certification is the most 
prevalent. It is directly applicable to the KO’s level of training and experience and 
applies to the COR’s level of training as it relates to the training provided by the KO. A 
COR relies on the KO to explain their responsibilities and the scope of their authority. 
They also rely upon the KO to provide an adequate quality assurance surveillance plan 
(QASP) and statement of work (SOW) which also is a reflection of that KO’s training 
and experience. Insufficient staffing does not have roots in training and certification, but 
is represented as a critical vulnerability in the CCF. The data in Table 1 presents no 
change in total reports between 2010 and 2012. There is then an increase in reports in 
2015. The lack of improvement suggests that either the DOD IGO recommendations 
were not applied by the contracting activities or that they were ineffective in correcting 
the problem. DOD IGO recommendation effectiveness is indeterminable due to the spike 
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in number of findings in the 2015 summary report. Without the ability to identify the 
effectiveness of the Oversight and Surveillance recommendations, they have been 
deemed non-applicable to this research’s objective of improving health of the CCF 
officer corps. 
• Property Accountability 
Property Accountability was identified as having the second greatest number of 
findings in investigated reports, with 34 total findings. Root causes for poor Property 
Accountability share a close relationship to Oversight and Surveillance, which is 
specifically listed as the cause of Property Accountability failure in the 2015 summary 
report (Department of Defense [DOD], 2015). Property Accountability remains only a 
small portion of Oversight and Surveillance as all contracts require proper oversight, but 
not all contracts involve Government Furnished Property, Facilities, or Equipment. Table 
1 shows a distinct drop in the number of reports between 2010 and 2012. Between 2012 
and 2015, the number of findings only increased by one. The sharp decline of reports 
between 2010 and 2012 suggests effective DOD IGO recommendations were 
incorporated in 2010. The continued low number suggests a new approach is required to 
further reduce the problem area; however, the initial recommendations continue to be 
effective. The next step is to assess the recommendations for potential application in the 
CCF; however, in the case of Property Accountability, the DOD IGO recommendations 
are not applicable to the CCF. The CCF’s critical vulnerabilities are more closely tied to 
Oversight and Surveillance as it applies to training and staffing, rather than Property 
Accountability. Recommendations in all three reports focused on utilizing an 
administrative department to maintain property accountability. Despite the relationship 
between Property Accountability and Oversight and Surveillance, the recommendations 
do not help to address Oversight and Surveillance problems outside of Property 
Accountability. As a result, the recommendations for Property Accountability cannot be 
adopted by the CCF to address their critical vulnerabilities. 
• Requirements 
The Requirements problem area follows closely behind Property Accountability, 
with 33 total findings. Requirements, as it pertains to the DOD IGO report, focuses on 
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ambiguity or changing requirements, out of scope requirements, and incomplete 
requirements. Though the KO is not the requirements generator and is not responsible for 
ambiguous or changing requirements, an experienced KO can often mitigate both issues 
and lessen or eliminate the negative impacts they bring to contract fulfillment. Out of 
scope and incomplete requirements are a direct reflection of the level and quality of 
training the customer has received for developing and defining their requirements. This 
problem area is abundant in CCF operations. Many of the CCF’s customers heavily rely 
on KOs in assisting them in defining requirements. Early customer training can reduce 
ambiguous and incomplete requirements. Within the CCF, the KOs are responsible for 
customer training and successful training hinges upon that KO’s knowledge and 
experience. This supports having multiple feeder MOSs for entry into the CCF, as the 
officer corps is subsequently able to provide greater breadth of knowledge and 
comprehensive understanding of the MAGTF and the warfighter needs. The decline in 
number of reports in 2012 suggests effective recommendations were implemented in 
2010; however, the return to the original level in 2015 suggests that either previous 
recommendations were no longer adhered to or that a new stem of problems grew 
between 2012 and 2015. Problems associated with requirements identification can be 
related to the level of customer requirements training that is provided. This is the reason 
the CCF needs to retain experienced, well-qualified CCF officers to provide the requisite 
training to customers to alleviate problems associated to requirements definition. 
• Contract Documentation 
With Contract Documentation containing 29 total reports, this problem area 
comprises nearly 26 percent of the total reports investigated. The Contract 
Documentation problem stems from KOs not adequately supporting their contracting 
decisions in the contract file. Internal to the CCF, Contract Documentation problems are 
often the result of over-burdened KOs, and are linked to a lack of experience or 
familiarity with deployed systems used for writing and managing contract awards, along 
with limitations in deployed reach back support due to deficiencies in manpower staffing. 
Failures in contract documentation can also be directly linked to returning officers not 
understanding or being aware of new regulations pertaining to documentation 
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requirements. Contract Documentation shows the greatest improvement and maintenance 
among the problem areas in Table 1. The improvement should reveal Contract 
Documentation as a potential source for possible corrective measures to apply to the 
CCF; however, the summary reports lack substantial detail in sections dedicated to 
Contract Documentation. Instead of providing potential corrective measures, the 
summary reports reference the FAR and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS) and include an examples of poor contract documentation from 
their reporting window. This lack of information leaves the summary reports unusable for 
CCF application regarding Contract Documentation. In absence of explicit DOD IGO 
recommendations, the research analysis determined poor documentation can mitigated 
within the CCF by implementing a comprehensive reintegration program for officers 
returning to the CCF that addresses new documentation requirements so they can better 
enforce contract file oversight. 
Though the CCF shares many of the systemic problem areas as experienced by 
DOD-wide contingency contracting, the potential corrective measures to remedy CCF 
critical vulnerabilities are not adequately addressed in the summary reports. Nonetheless, 
reports do reveal that inadequate training and understaffing is not only a problem 
contained within the CCF, but is also throughout DOD contingency contracting 
operations. 
B. APRIL 2016 3006 MOS BILLETS AND VACANCIES DISCUSSION AND 
ANALYSIS 
There are three key topics that require analysis when studying Table 2, as follows: 
billet staffing; distribution of vacancies; and data not provided by the table. Regarding 
billet staffing, the table displays nine vacant billets, leaving the CCF functioning at 73 
percent of its Table of Organization (T/O) authorized strength which is 33 total officer 
billets. In addition to the nine vacant billets, 16 billets were filled by a rank other than the 
T/O grade, suggesting potential problems with promotions of officers eligible to serve in 
the CCF. Table 6 depicts the T/O strength to actual strength variance by rank based upon 
the data presented in Table 2. The two most significant areas of interest are the ranks of 
major and lieutenant colonel, which comprise the CCF’s entire field grade officer 
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population. The CCF officer corps currently has two additional lieutenant colonels and is 
deficient seven majors. The deficiency of seven majors is cause for concern regarding 
fulfillment of field grade level billets in the CCF. Furthermore, one of the two additional 
lieutenant colonels is reported serving in the colonel’s billet at MCB QUANTICO 
Director RCO in Table 2; however, rather than staffing all lieutenant colonel billets and 
filling one T/O major’s billet with a lieutenant colonel, there are three lieutenant colonels 
currently filling major’s billets. This creates a gap in lieutenant colonel T/O billets that is 
then filled by majors and captains. While serving in a billet above one’s grade is 
beneficial for the Marine’s promotion, the opposite holds true as well. Serving too long in 
a billet beneath one’s grade is damaging to the Marine’s career. Also noted is the 
experience lost when staffing billets with a lower rank. 
Table 6.   Total CCF Manpower Readiness Percentages as of April 1, 2016. 
Adapted from Navarro (2016). 
Rank T/O Strength Actual Strength Variance Percent 
Variance 
Colonel 1 0 -1 -100% 
Lieutenant Colonel 6 8 +2 +33% 
Major 11 4 -7 -64% 
Captain 15 12 -3 -20% 
 
A widely accepted practice in the Marine Corps is filling a billet one higher or 
lower than the Marine’s rank is acceptable for short durations. This is generally 
acceptable because these Marines are interacting on a regular basis with Marines in the 
billets above them who possess their same MOS. As a 3006, the Marines are often 
removed from the mentorship of higher 3006 ranks while serving in their CCF tour, and 
even more so when serving in their tours back in their PMOS. A Major serving as a 3006 
is typically on their second tour in contracting and a lieutenant colonel is often on their 
third tour, with their experiences lending credibility to their ability to fulfill the CCF 
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billet in accordance with the T/O assigned grade. Of particular note, Table 2 reveals a 
captain filling a lieutenant colonel’s billet. This is not only a daunting task for the 
captain, but also leaves the command without the experience that is expected to 
adequately lead the organization. In the end, CCF units are left under staffed and lacking 
vital experience required to successfully execute the mission. 
Further analysis of Table 2 reveals that the distribution of vacancies is uneven, 
with two of the three 3rd MLG billets left vacant.  2nd MLG has one vacant billet and 1st 
MLG is fully staffed, though Table 2 reveals the lieutenant colonel billet is staffed by a 
captain. HQMC and Marine Corps Installations (MCI), Pacific are staffed at 50 percent. 
The remaining three vacancies leave those units with no officer leadership. These 
vacancies not only present a leadership and contracting oversight challenge, but also an 
administrative challenge when reporting enlisted performance. 
Despite the data presented in Table 2, the information not captured in the table 
reveals much about the manpower deficiencies in the CCF officer corps. The table does 
not fully reflect the potential 3006 strength. Without capturing the 3006 officers serving 
tours back in their PMOS, the potential to fill vacant billets and the duration those billets 
remain unfilled remains an unknown variable, especially considering some of these 3006 
officers may not desire to return for an additional CCF tour, choosing to remain in their 
PMOS. Table 2 also does not reflect the population selected on the CCLEB to become 
3006s because it is not prudent to track the entering population until they have been 
certified, as they are not fully qualified to execute a CCF billet. Though it is not prudent 
to capture the officers in training, the table does include officers currently fulfilling their 
graduate level training requirements via the NPS distance learning curriculum for 
contract management. While these Marines do occupy the available T/O billets, they are 
not deployable, leaving a gap in capability and providing a false impression of unit 
readiness. 
It is also important to note that Table 2 does not capture those retiring or exiting 
the Marine Corps. This gap in data tracking on Table 2 could potentially create a critical 
vulnerability in the CCF’s level of experience and appropriate staffing considerations. 
This threat correlates to problems experienced in the civilian acquisition workforce 
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within the DOD. Professors Rene Rendon and Keith Snider cite a quote from Senator 
Levin in their book Management of Defense Acquisition Projects as saying, “The root 
cause of these and other problems in the defense acquisition system is our failure to 
maintain an acquisition work force with the resources and skills needed to manage the 
department’s acquisition system” (2008, p. 268). Relating back to the CCF, an 
overpopulation of lieutenant colonels, coupled with the number that are willing to hold 
lower grade billets alludes to the idea that several lieutenant colonels may retire in the 
relative near future. Attempting to track an individual Marine’s intent to retire or exit the 
Marine Corps is not a realistic task; however, experienced leadership leaving the MOS is 
still cause for great concern. This loss of experience could generate similar problems 
faced by the civilian acquisition workforce. 
A detailed analysis of data from Table 2 has served to identify several critical 
vulnerabilities within the CCF. These critical vulnerabilities present themselves in the 
form of gapped billets due to officer critical shortfalls; misaligned staffing of billet grade 
to actual grade; inexperienced and unqualified (non-deployable) personnel filling T/O 
billets; and, an aging experience base approaching retirement. 
C. SURVEY DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
The survey data is used to confirm or deny assumptions pertaining to the research 
objective, and also to support conclusions and recommendations submitted in Chapter VI. 
Qualitative analysis of survey responses reconciled against literature review findings, 
served to strengthen the TIPS Model analysis of Personnel, Protocols, and Platforms 
yielding the resultant conclusions and recommendations for the future employment of 
officers in the CCF. Survey question discussion and analysis is provided in the following 
sub-sections. 
Question 1:  I am serving as or previously serves as: [officer or enlisted] 
While a 58 percent response rate only provides a slight majority opinion in the 
overall survey responses, the near even split between enlisted and officer respondents 
depicted in Figure 1 is consistent with the percentages to the total solicited for survey 
feedback. The conclusion drawn from the respondent demographics demonstrates that 
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any great disparage in responses that is distinguished by officer and enlisted responses 
can be attributed to a cultural difference between the roles they carry in the Marine Corps 
and within the CCF. 
Question 2: Does your command have a reintegration period for commissioned 
officers returning to the contracting MOS for a subsequent tour before they are 
able to deploy?  If yes, what training is required? 
The unanimous “no” response depicted in Figure 2 and additional comments 
provided support the conclusion that a formalized training program and reintegration 
period is necessary to re-educate officers who depart the contracting field for a PMOS 
billet and subsequently return for a CCF tour. Additionally, the Marine officers who 
return to their PMOS following a successful tour in contracting have little incentive to 
stay current on procurement policies or to even retain the knowledge learned in 
contracting since there may be no intent or opportunity to ever return to a contracting 
billet. Officers serving in a PMOS assignment have no requirement to maintain 
continuous learning points (CLP), attend contracting related training, or stay current on 
contracting procedures. Such performance is not captured on their FITREP performance 
evaluation; therefore, the incentive to do so is also diminished. Even if an officer 
attempted to maintain contracting proficiency, it may serve as a detriment to their career 
considering that maintaining proficiency in contracting can be a labor and time intensive 
effort that distracts Marine officers from PMOS duties. 
Question 3, 4, & 5: Upon completion of OJT [for Captains], what role could 
commissioned officers [3: Captains, 4: Majors, 5:  Lieutenant Colonels] have in 
the contracting community throughout their career progression?  Please select 
all that apply. 
The highest percentage yes for each rank depicted in Table 3 follows a logical 
progression. Captains, who are entry-level acquisition workforce members, must develop 
the fundamental skills of writing contracts to have any value to the Marine contracting 
community in subsequent tours.  Ninety percent of participants selected “yes” to captains 
could write contracts upon completion of OJT. The skills learned while writing contracts 
are carried forward as rank, authority, and responsibility increase commensurate with 
experience. More skill and experience writing contracts as captains will provide the tools 
 42 
necessary to groom a contracting member into a savvy acquisition professional capable of 
accepting the added responsibilities of carrying a warrant and obligating government 
funds. This conclusion is supported by the highest “yes” response rate for majors (95 
percent) to carry a warrant and award contracts as the most effective employment of 
officers at this rank. Conversely, as rank increases so does the recommendation for a 
particular officer not to write contracts. 
Participants selected writing contracts 90 percent of the time for captains, down to 
67 percent for majors, and only 38 percent of participants felt that lieutenant colonels 
should write contracts. The conclusion drawn from this trend is that as rank increases so 
does the expectation for that officer to be less involved in the technical aspects of an 
MOS and more involved in the supervisory role of managing a staff. This concept is 
supported by the overwhelming response for lieutenant colonels to serve as a contracting 
activity OIC (100 percent). Other trends documented from Table 3 include an increased 
response to see more senior officers serving as an OCS advisor (Capt – 48 percent, Maj – 
90 percent, LtCol – 95 percent) and also for the Acquisitions Command Billet (Capt – 5 
percent, Maj – 24 percent, LtCol – 67 percent). 
Two participants added the additional billet of deployed contingency contracting 
officer to responses to question 3. This further supports the conclusion that captains 
serving in a 3006 billet should focus on writing contracts since the principal function of a 
deployed Chief of Contracting Office (CCO) is to write contracts in support of mission 
requirements in a deployed environment. Additionally, these fundamental skills will carry 
forward in future contracting assignments. Similar comments were provided in regards to 
majors and lieutenant colonels serving in contracting as the comments provided for 
questions 4 and 5 also state that majors and lieutenant colonels could deploy as a CCO or 
Regional Contracting Center chief. One participant also included a recommendation for a 





Question 6: Which of the following are documented as critical vulnerabilities 
that affect the mission readiness for contracting?  Please select all that apply. 
Table 4 displays officer manpower shortfalls are clearly the highest ranked risk 
area selected unanimously by all 21 survey participants. This data supports the impetus 
for conducting this thesis research effort, that impermanent officer assignment to 
contracting serves to detriment the Marine Corps’ ability to efficiently perform its CCF 
mission. The unanimous response also indicates there is community interest in pursuing a 
permanent structure for officers in contracting. Further analysis to support this conclusion 
is covered in depth during the TIPS Model analysis. 
By stark contrast, and based on the survey population of active duty Marines, it is 
not surprising that GS Manpower shortfalls in the contracting community fell out as the 
lowest ranked critical vulnerability, as 15 of the 21 survey participants selected “no” to 
this question. This type of response could be partially due to biases of the active duty 
respondents, none the less, the manpower structure of GS contracting employees may be 
an applicable recommendation for future research efforts as it does impact the Marine 
Corps’ ability to meet its CCF mission. If officer manpower shortfalls in contracting do 
in fact exist it is expected that contracting activities will augment their contracting staff 
with civilian manpower to compensate for the lack of officers, but the extent to which 
this practice has occurred is unknown and such a study is beyond the scope of the 
research objectives of this thesis. 
The second highest ranked critical vulnerability, officer technical proficiency, was 
selected “yes” 17 out of 21 times by survey participants. This critical vulnerability further 
supports the conclusions drawn from question 2 that advocated officers will require a 
training and reintegration period when returning to contracting for subsequent tours 
following assignment outside of the CCF. Similarly, impermanent officer assignment was 
selected as a critical vulnerability by 16 of the 21 survey participants which serves to 
validate assumptions that officer impermanence is a critical vulnerability for contracting 
in the Marine Corps. 
All other responses to this question are not further addressed as they fail to 
identify a trend from which to draw conclusions and make recommendations. Five survey 
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participants included other critical vulnerabilities not provided in the survey list of 
choices, as follows: 
“Lack of Contracting Training” 
“Deployable manpower” 
“Lack of LDO/WO options” 
“Not a primary MOS/Lack of return tours” 
“Too many enlisted Marines claim to be ‘nondeployable.’ Too many Officers just 
want the contracting warrant for a better resume and not to write or award 
contracts.” 
These comments substantiate assumptions that the Marine Corps is not utilizing 
its trained 3006s in the most effective and efficient manner and the contracting 
community has varying opinions on how to address the issues associated to officer 
manpower shortfalls. 
Question 7: What incentives (if any) could be offered to support retention of 
commissioned officers in the contracting community?  Please select all that 
apply. 
Participants from the survey voted DOD funded graduate degree programs as the 
highest retention incentive method. The Marine Corps recognizes the value of 
incentivizing entry into contracting through DOD funded graduate degree program since 
it restructured its entry-level training for officers in contracting to go through NPS 
beginning in 2014. This Joint Applied Project team will be the first set of officers since 
2007 to obtain the AMOS of 3006 through the NPS curriculum. Despite the incentive, the 
graduate degree through NPS is only offered to provide training upon initial entry into 
contracting; not as an incentive method of returning for a subsequent tour. 
Officers are prone to not return to contracting for subsequent tours after 
completing an initial assignment. A second tour or third tour in contracting as a 3006 is 
almost always voluntary for officers. The MOS occupational field sponsor for 
contracting, a position normally filled by a 3006 lieutenant colonel that works out of 
HQMC, LPC, will typically solicit return tours from officers that meet the right career 
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timing. All officers returning to contracting must have previously completed the 
necessary training for DAWIA certifications, and must be willing to return for a second 
or third tour. Often officers will view a second or third tour in contracting as a potential 
hazard to further one’s career since the time away from their PMOS does not benefit 
them in anyway and is more likely to reduce their opportunities for promotion. Survey 
participants overwhelmingly voted that some form of incentive should be implemented as 
20 out of 21 survey participants, depicted in Table 5, selected “no” to the None answer 
provided for the question. The potential conclusion drawn from this survey response is 
that the Marine Corps CCF could benefit from incentivizing officers to return to 
contracting. Additionally, several comments were offered by survey participants as to 
more appropriate incentive techniques, as follows: 
“A primary MOS so they may remain competitive” 
“Permanent officers” 
“Higher promotion capability than LtCol” 
“Ensure the individual is not penalized MOS credibility from his/her primary 
career field. Can lead to 2nd and 3rd tours in the contracting field and establish 
continuity and knowledge retention.” 
“Better advocacy on promotion boards, this is a career detriment. Change that and 
you will be able to retain individuals in the community. Otherwise they transfer 
back to their primary MOSs to enable them to get promoted.” 
Four out of the five comments offered in response to this question relate to issues 
surrounding the promotion opportunities for officers that return to contracting for 
subsequent tours, indicating officers are not likely to return to contracting for second or 
third tours because doing so will harm their career. The comment, “permanent officers,” 
further supports the objective of this research, identifying a potential manpower and 
career path consideration for recruiting and retaining experienced, well-qualified officers 
for service in the CCF. 
Finally, 11 of the 21 survey participants offered additional comments at the end of 
the survey ranging in topics from training opportunities, to retention techniques for 
contracting. The comments cited various focus areas and recommended courses of action, 
but these comments clearly indicate a strong sentiment that impermanent officer 
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assignments in contracting creates a series of problems that places undue stress on the 
CCF. One notable comment is as follows: “Bottom line: if the MC wants to really get 
serious about this career field, it needs a PMOS.”  This discussion is furthered in the 
TIPS Model analysis which provides a detailed study into the research objective using the 
Personnel, Protocol, and Platform pillars. The 11 comments received are provided as 
direct quotes for review in Appendix A. 
D. YODER’S MANDATORY PILLARS FOR INTEGRATIVE SUCCESS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF CCF PERSONNEL, PROTOCOL, AND PLATFORMS 
Within this sub-chapter, a discussion and analysis of the results of this research’s 
literature review and data collection and analysis is provided through the lens of the TIPS 
Model. The three pillar analysis of the CCF officer structure is used to identify, dissect, 
and define root causes to problems within the following focus areas as it pertains to 
current Marine Corps and CCF practices: Personnel, Protocol, and Platforms. Analysis 
conducted under each of the pillars is briefly described as follows: 
• Personnel: The analysis conducted under the personnel pillar focuses on 
the current capability to utilize the CCF officer corps to effectively and 
efficiently meet operating force requirements while determining impacts 
on the CCF’s total mission readiness. This analysis will also include 
appropriate accession pipeline and training considerations. 
• Protocol: The protocol pillar will include an analysis of the doctrine that 
establishes the entry criteria for officers serving in the CCF and the 
impacts associated to the transient nature of Marine KOs. The protocol 
analysis will also discuss career path considerations for officers serving in 
the CCF. 
• Platform: The analysis of contracting platforms will include a review of 
required systems access, training requirements, and an evaluation of 
technical proficiencies achieved by officers during a contracting tour. 
Outcomes of this analysis will be reconciled against current practices to 
analyze potential detriments to the CCF when officers are absent for three 
years or greater. 
The results of the TIPS Model analysis conducted within this sub-chapter, 
combined and synced with other research data findings will inform the recommendations 
and conclusions of this project as they pertain to the research objective. 
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1. Personnel 
The personnel pillar of the TIPS Model will be analyzed from three distinct but 
interrelated perspectives. The research will assess mission readiness based on Marine 
Corps current capabilities. Thereafter, analysis of appropriate accession pipeline 
considerations will be conducted. Finally, current capabilities will be compared against 
current force requirements. 
a. Mission Readiness Based on Marine Corps Current Capabilities 
The Marine Corps strongly emphasizes mission readiness amongst all of its 
forces, and achieves readiness through vigorous training initiatives. Marine Corps 
commissioned officers that serve as 3006s are required to achieve training readiness 
standards that ultimately support the accomplishment of Mission Essential Tasks for 
reporting in the Defense Readiness Reporting System. They do so by gaining and 
sustaining proficiency in the training events prescribed in the NAVMC 3500.64B Supply 
Administration and Operations T&R Manual at both collective (unit) and individual 
levels (DON, 2014). See Appendix B for current listing of 3006 T&R standards adapted 
from the NAVMC 3500.64B. Additionally, the Marine Corps is currently drafting a new 
MCO governing the CCF Program. Version 21 of this draft MCO was coming out of 
General Officer review at the time of this writing (DON, in press). Included as 
appendices to this draft order are an IDP and CCM that further develop and define an 
extensive set of proficiency checks that contracting Marines are to obtain under the 
purview of their Reporting Senior’s supervision. 
Based on the requirements delineated in the T&R and draft MCO, it is evident 
that the Marine Corps takes a heavy, vested interest in developing a strong contracting 
capability in order to maintain mission readiness and strengthen its forward presence, 
being the first to fight in any location on the globe. This fact cannot be overemphasized 
when it comes to the Marine Corps 3006 presence, which is a low-density, high-demand 
AMOS that only commissioned officers can obtain. The Marine Corps is investing tens of 
thousands of dollars on each of its commissioned officers it selects to become 3006s; a 
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dominant portion of those training dollars being spent on graduate level schooling 
provided by NPS in the 835 Master of Science in Contract Management Program. 
The Marine Corps 3006 presence only consists of a T/O authorized strength of 33 
Marine officers serving in CCF billets at any given time (see Table 2). Despite this 
authorization, the Marine Corps is currently gapped nine 3006 billets across all ranks, as 
depicted in Tables 2 and 6, and in particular, the gap mainly affects field grade officer 
billets. Table 6 displays total CCF manpower readiness percentages sorted by applicable 
rank, based upon the number of billets filled compared to those gapped. This gap serves 
to deteriorate the Marine Corps’ current capabilities within its CCF, as appropriately 
staffed officer leadership and oversight, particularly senior level officers, is lacking 
within contracting activities throughout the Marine Corps. This problem has been 
persistent enough that the Marine Corps has published MARADMIN 122/15 stating, 
“Due to the critical shortage of 3006 contracting officers in the Marine Corps, vacancies 
in some billets will be unavoidable” (2015b, p. 1). The MARADMIN also states, “Every 
effort will be made to fill key billets. An appropriate memo will be placed in the 
permanent records of all officers selected for follow on tours to ensure no unintended 
negative consequences [pertaining to promotion] occur” (USMC, 2015b, p. 1). This 
admission of a gapped capability is designed to temper supported commander’s and 
customer’s expectations of support from the Marine Corps CCF, while simultaneously 
not hurting the officer’s career promotion potential. Moreover, it identifies the potential 
need to address problems within the 3006 career progression path, as well as enforcement 
mechanisms and incentives for officers to return to subsequent tours in the CCF. 
The small structure of the CCF officer corps does not provide for redundancies. 
Marine officers serve in two distinct roles within the CCF. One role is serving in an OCS 
advisory billet at MARFOR commands or at one of the MEFs, and as applicable at other 
dedicated commands such as Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC).  
3006s also serve as warranted KOs at the ECP established within each of the MEFs, or at 
an SE or other dedicated command (DON, in press). With such a small authorized 
strength combined with the problem of gapped billets, the Marine Corps’ current 
capability to achieve mission readiness is degraded causing a greater burden on the 
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enlisted members serving in the CCF as well as burdening supported customers. One 
example of degraded support and mission readiness is the ability for the Marine Corps to 
adequately deploy 3006s in an OCOC during large-scale operations. This cell is designed 
to perform functions such as OCS planning; requirements development assistance; 
contract support prioritization and validation processes assistance; and COR 
management. OCS advisors within this cell coordinate liaison support and provide a 
conduit between the GCC and external contracting support for Marine units in the AOR 
(CJCS, 2014). These crucial functions directly affect success outcomes in combat, further 
underlining the need for the Marine Corps to address capability gaps in the 3006 structure 
of the CCF. 
The Marine Corps CCF has made recent strides to improve its 3006 readiness, 
particularly closing its DAU schoolhouse located at Camp Johnson, North Carolina in 
2014. It now sends its Marine officers through graduate level education to obtain Level I, 
II, and III certification eligibility in contracting, with the follow-on requirement to 
complete one year of OJT training at a Regional Contracting Office under one of the MCI 
Commands before assignment to the ECP (USMC, 2014). Despite this stride towards 
educational improvement, the Marine Corps needs to revisit its accession pipeline 
considerations and the 3006 career progression path, as well as retention incentives to 
maintain a strong presence of 3006s and alleviate future gaps in billets that degrade its 
CCF capabilities. 
b. Appropriate Accession Pipeline Considerations 
Traditionally, 3006 sourcing has come from three distinct MOS fields that work 
intimately with one another to accomplish mission requirements, these being supply 
officers, comptrollers, and logistics officers. This blend of expertise lends diversity to the 
talents these selected officers bring into the CCF upon their accession. Additionally, 
Marine officers are selected for contracting after having completed a minimum of one 
successful tour in their PMOS, lending credible MOS experience that further enables the 
CCF’s critical thinking and decision making capabilities. In 2015, the Marine Corps 
(2015b) announced changes to its accession pipeline considerations, stating the 
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following: “All training for 3006 contingency contracting officers is either through 
selection on the CCLEB, for Supply Officers only, to attend the NPS resident’s course in 
acquisition and contract management or selection to the NPS distance learning program 
for contract management” (p. 1). This MARADMIN established Supply officers as the 
only MOS field that will be drawn from to create the Marine Corps’ next generation of 
officers in serving in the CCF. Prior to this announcement, the Marine Corps publicly 
recognized that experiences throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring 
Freedom validated contracting as a critical capability that requires highly skilled and 
professional officers. It also stated that NPS would replace the DAU schoolhouse as the 
primary source of accession training in order to provide for a healthy and desirable KO 
career path (USMC, 2014). The combination of these changes clearly indicates that the 
Marine Corps recognizes the need to source the most highly qualified officers for 
contracting, and they are attempting to incentivize this by offering a master’s degree in 
order to foster competition amongst those officers that desire selection into the field via 
the CCLEB. This ensures the cream of the crop is selected to fill this critical capability; 
however, the Supply officer only eligibility criteria potentially inhibits diversified talents 
from the finance and logistics communities from bolstering the Marine Corps’ overall 
ability to provide high quality contracting support. 
The Marine Corp has published NAVMC 1200.1A W/CH1, also known as the 
MOS Manual, which defines occupational specialties found on the T/O in the Total Force 
Structure Management System that leads to generation of the Authorized Strength Report 
(DON, 2015). According to this manual, supply officers provide supply support insight 
for operational planning requirements; supervise transportation of supplies and 
equipment; manage the transmittal of public funds; participate in the budget process, 
administer, and expend allotted funds; and make necessary recommendations to the 
Commanding Officer regarding supply support procedures. This MOS description makes 
supply officers a prime candidate for contracting accession; however, the manual also 
states that KOs work closely with the finance and supply communities to ensure proper 
execution and expenditure of appropriated funds. Because of the intimate link between 
Comptrollers and contracting, an argument could be made that the accession pipeline 
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should also be reopened to those other than supply officers, namely comptrollers. There 
is also added value in allowing logistics officers to continue to enter into contracting as 
they are often heavily involved in planning conferences for operations and exercises, 
serving as the voice for G-4 and S-4 coded shops for requirements related concerns. 
Additionally, according to doctrine stated in the MCRP 4-11E, Contingency Contracting, 
contracting falls under the purview of the G-4. The G-4 retains operational control of all 
contracting personnel within the major subordinate command’s area of operations unless 
otherwise directed by the Commanding General (USMC, 2009). This doctrine further 
substantiates the relevance of the logistic officer as an appropriate feeder MOS for 
accession into contracting. 
The Marine Corps could consider the use of extended length contracts for officers 
that obtain the 3006 MOS. Officers serving in 3006 billets are members of the CCF and 
ultimately they serve as members of the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) 
workforce under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) for AT&L. CCF 
qualification requirements are codified in 10 U.S. Code § 1724; specifically, the law 
requires completion of at least 24 semester credit hours or the equivalent of study from an 
accredited institution of higher education or similar educational institution in any of the 
disciplines of accounting, business, finance, law, contracts, purchasing, economics, 
industrial management, marketing, quantitative methods, or organization and 
management (10 U.S. Code § 1724, 2011). Beyond these requirements, DAU provides 
three certification levels for contracting professionals obtained via the successful 
completion of a plethora of Acquisition (ACQ coded), Contracting (CON coded), and 
Continuous Learning (CLC coded) courses. Certification eligibility is additionally tied to 
length of contracting experience one has completed in an acquisition coded billet 
identification code (BIC). Experience requirements range from one, two, and four years 
for each level of certification, respectively (Defense Acquisition University, 2016). 
Additionally, within the Marine Corps Acquisition Procedures Supplement, the Marine 
Corps has established a five level Contracting Officer Warrant Program delineating even 
further training and experience requirements for contracting warrant eligibility at each of 
the specified levels (USMC, 2016b). Furthermore, the draft MCO for the CCF provides 
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an extensive description of roles and responsibilities pertaining to billet positions 
throughout the CCF. Most of these descriptions require high levels of past experience in 
contracting at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war in order to enable the 
officer to effectively execute the requirements of the billet in accordance with doctrinal 
methodology. This exhaustive list of training and experience requirements, combined 
with the perpetually changing FAR regulations should serve as a demand signal to retain 
KOs within the contracting specialty for periods greater than a standard three-year 
rotation back into their PMOS. Similarities can be drawn to the aviation and legal 
communities within the Marine Corps. For example, due to the extensive training 
requirements to become a naval aviator, pilots incur a 96-month or 72-month active duty 
service obligation, primarily served within the aviation community, based upon the 
platform they end up flying (DON, 2003). This ensures the Marine Corps retains a well-
trained officer to carry out a highly technical profession, and contracting should be no 
different. Currently, every officer is screened by the CCLEB for the fiscal year in which 
they are set to conduct a permanent change of station. Under the new accession construct, 
a Supply officer’s selection to attend NPS and accession into contracting is mandated as 
opposed to the officer electing to be selected for a move into contracting. This selection 
process would need revision in order to accommodate longer active duty service 
obligations, as it would be unfair to require an officer to accept extended service 
obligations based on a choice that is made for them. The solution to this problem is 
beyond the scope of this research; however, this research strongly suggests that 
appropriate authority should review this consideration of extended length contracts for 
CCF officers. 
Upon accession into contracting, all CCF personnel are required to participate in 
an IDP to ensure that core competencies are trained to and sustained to enable the CCF to 
deliver mission critical capabilities (DON, in press). The draft MCO contains a sample 
IDP as an appendix, and it also contains a CCM as an additional appendix to be used in 
conjunction with the IDP to train to competencies. The CCO must ensure the 
implementation and management of a robust training program combining the use of these 
two tools. Use of these tools is in keeping with best practices, and this research suggests 
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that officers could be assigned an IDP mentor that monitors their career progression and 
signs off on proficiency and sustainment levels achieved after the designated trainer(s) 
have assessed the officer’s performance on an individual task. Officers should 
subsequently be deployed in real world operations based upon the levels of technical 
competency they have demonstrated, and the decision for their assignment on a particular 
deployment should be heavily influenced by the IDP mentor working in conjunction with 
the CCO to ensure best fit for the anticipated mission complexity levels. 
c. Current Capabilities Compared Against Current Force Requirements 
The importance of commissioned officer advocacy within the contracting 
community cannot be overstated, particularly when analyzing the differences between 
command authority and contracting authority; as contracting authority is ultimately what 
enables the KO’s capabilities. HQMC contracting authority originates from the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) and is delegated to the 
Deputy Commandant (DC), I&L at HQMC. With the exception of those actions reserved 
specifically for head of contracting activity (HCA) approval, DC, I&L has delegated full 
authority to the Assistant Deputy Commandant (ADC), I&L under LPC (USMC, 2009). 
Contracting authority is further delegated by ADC I&L, LPC to the operating forces 
ECPs in 1st MLG, 2d MLG, and 3d MLG as well as to SE contracting offices within the 
Marine Corps Field Contracting System (DON, in press). Of concern to this research 
discussion is the contracting authority delegated to KOs that are slated to deploy with 
supported commands via the ECP. As the MCRP 4-11E states, “The commander retains 
operational control of the contracting team; however, contracting authority and oversight 
of the contingency contracting office remains the responsibility of the HCA” (2009, p.2-
2). Moreover, the draft MCO adds “KOs must be placed within the organization where 
they can maintain functional independence and make sound business decisions without 
improper or undue influence” (in press, p. 1-4).”  The commissioned officer serving in 
the CCF is of key importance in the enforcement of the clear lines of authority that CCF 
personnel must follow, particularly when the KO is an enlisted service member. 
Complaints have arose in the past where commands receiving contracting support from 
enlisted KOs are more inclined to attempt to enforce their command authority over the 
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Marine in order to procure what it is that they want. The ECP CCO and their staff serves 
as critical reach back support to this KO in order to clearly articulate and enforce that the 
two distinct lines of authority cannot be crossed. One mechanism of enforcement is the 
threat that the KO’s contracting authority could be stripped if the CCO determines it 
necessary to revoke the KO’s warrant in a situation where the command authority is 
attempting to force an illegal action. The ability to provide such push back requires well-
seasoned commissioned officer support to eliminate undue command influence on 
enlisted contracting personnel. As an additional contracting authority enforcement 
measure, first-level evaluations of KOs must be performed within the contracting career 
chain (DOD, 2005). 
Officers accomplish the requirements for obtaining contracting experience 
through OJT conducted at SE locations such as the Regional Contracting Offices (RCO) 
under the different MCIs. Before the CCF Realignment in 2015, the majority of CCF 
Marines were assigned under the SE to provide support within the RCOs when not 
serving on a deployment. Through this relationship, some RCOs became reliant on the 
Marine support provided to augment their civilian staff workload, and experienced 
officers were valuable assets utilized to interface with key garrison support staffs that are 
viewed with keen interest from high-level authorities. With the CCF realignment toward 
the ECP construct within the MLGs, the displacement of officers out of the SE 
potentially results in disrupted contracting support to garrison units and installations. 
Despite the realignment, the ECP and SE relationship still exists as all entry-level CCF 
personnel are still required to OJT within the SE in order to obtain the best training and 
contracting experience commensurate with the contracts that are required in the 
expeditionary environment (DON, in press). It is recognized that the realignment does 
create a larger burden on SEs to now serve as the training grounds for entry-level CCF 
personnel. Additionally, officers serving in an OJT status are not knowledgeable enough 
to speak intelligently on contracting matters pertaining to the key garrison support staffs 
as mentioned above. Despite the loss of experienced personnel, the SE does gain the 
benefit of increased workload support, particularly as an OJT Marine becomes more 
competent in their abilities throughout their tenure in the SE. 
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Officers trained in contracting are threatened with the loss of skills upon 
completion of their OJT at the SE. The majority of the CCF’s capability resides at the 
ECP, where Marines are slated to support operational deployments and exercises while 
also providing reach back support for ongoing operations. Upon completion of NPS 
training and OJT, officers report to the ECP for follow-on duties. The contracting 
authority for the ECP is limited to contracts executed in support of exercises and 
deployments for Joint Force or MAGTF unit operations where the performance of the 
contract is to be executed in support of exercises or operations being conducted 
OCONUS (DON, in press). This limitation on contracting authority inhibits the ECP’s 
ability to aid in garrison contracting support requirements. Moreover, contracting is a 
perishable skillset; therefore, officers that transfer to the ECP need to be engaged in real-
world operations as soon as possible to retain the skills obtained during their training. As 
a possible recommendation for officer employment, if a deployment or exercise is 
available, but at a future date where the Pre-deployment Training Program cycle has yet 
to commence for the operation, the CCF should potentially look at establishing Fleet 
Assistance Program (FAP) agreements between the ECP and SE, beyond the extent of 
existing OJT agreements, that provide officers an opportunity to continue to hone their 
contracting skills while serving as KOs and contract specialists in the SE. This would 
enable officers to sustain and further develop contracting proficiencies prior to executing 
operational requirements, and during dwell periods between deployment cycles. The 
CCO of the ECP could work hand-in-hand with the CCO of the SE to ensure that the 
officer is appropriately assigned responsibilities. Moreover, this would increase the 
utilization of officers within the CCF and serve to capitalize on the high cost of education 
that they receive as an entry-level member of the CCF. To further support this potential 
recommendation, the draft MCO already has a provision built into it, stating, “Due to the 
limited number of CCF Marines in the Marine Corps, all qualified Marines in SE offices 
are subject to supporting joint individual augment billets and Marine Corps specific 
mission deployments, when globally sourced or tasked through request for forces or 
request for capabilities” (in press, p. 4-14). This provision means that an officer is easily 
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accessible when operational requirements arise; and de-FAP back to the ECP could take 
place within 24 hours to employ the officer accordingly. 
In 2015, the Marine Corps directed commanders to establish SRRB for the review 
of service contracts, with validation authority established no lower than a first General 
Officer or Senior Executive Service level (USMC, 2015b). The SRRB screens all service 
requirements packages for contract actions that exceed the simplified acquisition 
threshold, currently $150,000.00. The technical expertise to establish such a review board 
rests solely with experienced officers and senior enlisted members of the CCF that have 
well-founded backgrounds in contracting and are capable of interfacing with General 
Officer level staff to validate the fiscal law elements of purpose, time, amount, as well as 
clear up ambiguities that exist in requirements packages. The increased oversight on 
reviewing service contracts, due to the complexities involved in defining them and 
paying for them, lends additional credibility to establishing officers as a more permanent 
feature in the CCF, in line with extended active duty service obligations for officers in 
contracting. Furthermore, another potential recommendation is for the Marine Corps to 
specifically assess CCF officer corps capabilities within the CCF concurrent with the 
conduct of annual capabilities based assessments. These assessments are directed in the 
draft MCO in order to ensure proper training, education, and readiness to execute the 
OCS mission within the CCF (DON, in press). The SRRB program is one example of a 
functional area that could be specifically reviewed as part of the capability assessment of 
officers. Advising on a SRRB panel is one of the many critical functions of OCS that an 
officer must learn as they progress in their career in contracting; demanding they grow as 
an expert in the field. Arguably, steady three year rotations in and out of the CCF do not 
adequately prepare officers to effectively advise on requirements that increase in 
complexities when moving up the scale from tactical levels of contracting, and into the 
operational and strategic levels of contracting. Findings from annual capabilities based 
assessments could also serve to indicate to HQMC whether or not extended active duty 
service obligations are a valid need for consideration. 
Finally, research has indicated the potential to garner higher-level advocacy for 
officers in the CCF. The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 
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2007 mandated, “The assignment of a senior commissioned officer with appropriate 
acquisition experience and qualifications to act as head of contingency contracting during 
combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, who shall report 
directly to the commander of the combatant command in whose area of responsibility the 
operations occur” (Pub. L. 109-364, 2006, sec. 2333). Based on this requirement, another 
potential recommendation is for the Marine Corps to adopt a Deputy to Head of 
Contingency Contracting as a Colonel or Brigadier General billet, to be filled by a 3006. 
A senior commissioned officer, by law, is supposed to act as head of contingency 
contracting, which would justify the need for each service component to develop a deputy 
billet that serves to make liaison with the appointed head of contingency contracting with 
matters regarding the individual service components’ employment of its CCF manpower. 
The creation of such a billet within the T/O structure would create an opportunity that 
would incentivize officers to desire to grow and promote within billets in the CCF. 
2. Protocol  
Under the TIPS Model, the protocol pillar of the CCF is specifically analyzed to 
discuss MOS entrance criteria of CCF officers. This discussion and analysis is not limited 
to the Marine Corps, rather the analysis is expanded to encompass the entrance criteria 
for officers entering into contracting in other branches of service. A greater 
understanding of different service branch protocols should better inform 
recommendations and conclusions that the Marine Corps may be able to adapt in order to 
achieve greater efficiencies in accomplishing the CCF mission. 
The protocol pillar of the TIPS Model “represents the existing or desirable set of 
rules and procedures, including sound business, planning, and military doctrine, that 
govern the” eligibility requirements, roles, and responsibilities established for Marine 
Corps officers serving in the contracting field (Yoder, Long, & Nix, 2012, p. 365). The 
central theme of protocol analysis revolves around how commissioned officers in the 
Marine Corps enter the contracting field and what opportunities exist for their growth as a 
subject matter expert in the contracting community. This section also examines the 
protocols governing the entrance criteria for officers assigned to contracting in the 
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following branches of service: Army, Air Force, and Navy. Protocol findings from other 
services will be compared against the established Marine Corps protocols. Throughout 
this section, potential recommendations are offered as to how commissioned officers can 
best support Marine Corps contracting functions and continue to stay competitive for 
promotion among other Marine officers within their MOS. 
a. Commissioned Officers in Marine Corps Contracting 
In the Marine Corps, contracting is not an entry-level MOS for both officer and 
enlisted personnel. Service members must complete at least one tour in their PMOS prior 
to applying for a contracting position. Officers must also have met performance standards 
to qualify for career designation and accepted appointment for indefinite active duty 
service which requires a minimum of 540 days of observed FITREP evaluations (DON, 
2014). This 540 day evaluation usually occurs in each Marine officer’s first three and a 
half years of service as an officer, as some reports may be unobserved within that time. 
Contracting is not unique in regard to the officer acceptance of career designation to 
continue on active duty beyond the preliminary three and a half year period; however, the 
CCF has the added complexity of accepting personnel with no direct prior experience in 
contracting. Personnel arrive in an occupational field rooted with highly technical and 
legal jargon that requires easily two years or more of regular day-to-day involvement to 
gain proficiency and become useful in the field. Considering the normal rotation time for 
service members to transfer billet assignments and duty stations occurs approximately 
every three years, the ability for officers serving in the contracting field to develop into 
subject matter experts becomes significantly challenged. 
The Marine Corps has recognized the challenges associated to officer training and 
retention in contracting and has established protocols to link contracting and supply 
specialties making supply a NMOS for contracting. The ultimate goal under this protocol 
is that future officers serving in contracting will all have the primary specialty of supply 
officer so that, “CCF officers should be rotated between 3002 [supply officer MOS] and 
3006 assignments in order to maintain CCF proficiency while remaining competitive for 
promotion in their primary 3002 MOS” (USMC, in press, p. 3-10). In 2014, the Marine 
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Corps changed the eligibility criteria for officers to enter the CCF by limiting entry 
exclusively to supply officers. This transition allowed 3006 manpower to be more 
seamlessly interchanged between a PMOS and an AMOS, but removed the possibility of 
qualified officers from other MOSs to enter the CCF. Contracting personnel work closely 
with the finance community in the expenditure of appropriated funds, and also with 
logisticians during the performance of contracts, particularly contracts for life support 
services awarded by CCF warranted KOs. Contracting must also work closely with 
operations officers to best support unit needs within a commander’s intent and 
appropriate planning and time considerations. By restricting entrance criteria eligibility to 
only supply officers, the Marine Corps has limited the opportunities to obtain well-
qualified officers from other specialties that could provide valuable experience inputs to 
the CCF. Supply is only one function in much a larger model that governs the contracting 
process. As a potential recommendation, the Marine Corps could once again allow other 
specialties such as comptrollers and logistics officers to enter the contracting field via 
CCLEB selection. 
The recommendation to continue utilizing officers from the supply community 
would remain in effect. Supply officers have unique skills that are easily transferable and 
directly relevant to the contracting community. For example, supply officers are often 
assigned as the action officer for most contracting functions at the unit level, such as 
appointment as the AO for the GCPC program as previously discussed. This appointment 
demonstrates a supply officer’s ability to execute and oversee contracting transactions 
performed below the micro-purchase threshold which often represents the highest volume 
of contracting transactions for any given unit. Supply officers have direct exposure and 
oversight of this program while serving in their PMOS, giving the supply community 
relevant insight and understanding of the contracting process. While this aspect of supply 
neatly fits into a contracting model, many of the duties assigned a supply officer do not 
have any relevance in the contracting community.   
Many of the day-to-day activities performed by a supply officer are not directly 
transferrable to the contracting field, and any skills that are easily transferrable represent 
a very minute portion of that officer’s time conducting day-to-day business. As an 
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example, property accountability and funds management are central to a supply officer’s 
daily activities, both demanding equal levels of oversight and attention. While funds 
management is one aspect of supply operations, it prioritized among competing interests 
of other supply functional areas. Funds management is crucial in the world of contracting 
operations; therefore, a more suited direct link to accomplishing this aspect of contracting 
could be to draw on personnel from the finance community to leverage their direct and 
vast amounts of relevant expertise in funds management. 
In order to make recommendations for the best pathway to enter contracting for 
Marine officers, this research will analyze and discuss the protocols governing the 
entrance criteria for officers entering into contracting in other service components. A 
discussion of the protocols governing the entrance criteria, training, and development of 
officers serving in Army, Air Force, and Navy contracting follows. 
b. Commissioned Officers in Air Force Contracting 
Officers serving in the Air Force contracting workforce select contracting as their 
desired MOS upon recruitment into military service, and are subsequently assigned the 
64P MOS designation as a primary career field. These officer’s receive formal MOS 
training at the Mission Ready Contracting Officer Course at Wright Patterson Air Force 
Base. According to the Air Force career development guidebook under skill and career 
progression information, “there are three developmental stages:  tactical, operational, and 
strategic. Each stage is important and provides unique experiences, and collectively, 
provide an integrated and progressive approach to building contracting competencies” 
(Department of the Air Force, 2014, p. 21). Per the guidebook the tactical level is 
approximately 0–10 years of contracting experience, the operational level is 
approximately 10–20 years of contracting experience, and the strategic level is 
approximately 20-plus years of contracting experience. 
(1) Tactical 
Officers in the Air Force contracting community begin their careers with entry-
level operational contracting experience and are charged with providing, “cradle-to-grave 
contract support to meet the needs of installation commanders, deployed commanders, 
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and resident, tenant, and supported units” (DoAF, 2014, p. 23). This entry-level model 
for the Air Force is similar to the Marine Corps protocols for assigning officers to an OJT 
period at RCOs where Marine officers will support installation and operational 
commanders through contracting requirements ranging from one-time buys of supplies 
and services such as video teleconferencing equipment to bulldozer repair services. 
Following the entry level exposure at the tactical level, these Airmen move up to 
an intermediate sub-level gauged at approximately 4–10 years of contracting experience 
where they gain systems experience and have the opportunity to support major 
acquisition programs at the Air Force Materiel Command and Space and Missile Systems 
Center. Per the Air Force career guidebook, “64P [contracting] officers are high demand, 
low density assets in the acquisitions community which makes each and every 64P 
officer vitally important to the program offices in which they serve” (DoAF, 2014, p. 25). 
These Air Force officers work exclusively as Procuring Contracting Officers gaining 
exposure to both installation, operational, and acquisitions contract support for essentially 
the first 10 years in the field. 
The Air Force career model is in stark contrast to the Marine Corps protocols of 
inducting second-tour officers from a PMOS into an assignment to an AMOS of 3006 
with the initial billet lasting three years in duration. Similarities exist for the entry-level 
assignment to installation contracting activities where Marine officers will serve for 
approximately three years writing installation support contracts, but for Air Force 
officers, after their initial tour in contracting these officers are offered additional career 
development opportunities to grow within Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAP), which the Marine Corps currently does not offer as an established career path. 
(2) Operational 
The operational level of an Air Force officer serving in contracting occurs 
approximately during years 10–20, and per the guidebook, “is characterized by an 
increase in responsibility and authority with leadership and career broadening 
opportunities” (DoAF, 2014, p. 28). Billet opportunities that exist for officers serving at 
the operational level of contracting include OCS planner, joint duty assignments through 
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such programs as the Army-Air Force Exchange Service, Defense Commissary Agency, 
Special Operations Command, and “a variety of joint systems program offices (e.g., Joint 
Strike Fighter)” (DoAF, 2014, p. 32). Squadron command is also encouraged for the field 
grade officers serving in the operational level of contracting. The guidebook remarks that, 
“Squadron command, and equivalent DCMA tertiary Contract Management Office 
command, positions are valuable leadership opportunities within the contracting career 
field” (DoAF, 2014, p. 31). Marine Corps field grade officers serving in contracting are 
typically returning for a second tour following a PMOS tour of three years or more where 
they had little to no exposure to contracting duties. The billet opportunities for Marine 
Corps field grade officers include OCS planners on the MEF staff, and serving as the 
director or deputy of a RCO. The Marine Corps does not currently offer any joint duty 
exchange programs or command opportunities for field grade officers serving in 
contracting as the availability of qualified field grade officers possessing a contracting 
background is in short supply. 
(3) Strategic 
According to the guidebook, “In order to achieve rank at the strategic level (i.e., 
colonel and above), an officer should develop and integrate a deep understanding of Air 
Force missions and how tactics, techniques, procedures, technology and people achieve 
synergistic results and desired effects” (DoAF, 2014, p. 35). The Marine Corps does not 
currently possess a strategic level contracting career path as the senior ranking officer 
assigned to contracting is a lieutenant colonel. Additionally, it is rare for Marine officers 
to return to contracting for a third tour due to the extended time out of their primary MOS 
and due to the manpower demands of field grade officers across all MOS communities. 
c. Commissioned Officers in Army Contracting 
The Army seeks second tour officers at the grade of O-2 and above to apply for 
entrance into the 51C MOS (contracting) via an annual accession board that is highly 
competitive. Each soldier must have 24 undergraduate business hours to be given 
consideration at the accession board for the 51C MOS. The Army follows a 
reclassification process similar to the Marine Corps as it pulls from existing specialties 
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such as logistics or supply, but any MOS is eligible for entry into 51C given the officer 
meets the 24 business credit hours prerequisite. Similar to officers in the Marine Corps, 
Army officers selected to enter contracting retain their PMOS designation (e.g., a 
logistics officer will still maintain their logistics officer designation), but unlike officers 
in the Marine Corps, Army officers enter the contracting field permanently. Both the 
Marine Corps and Army utilize a secondary MOS designation for contracting, but Army 
officers have no requirement to transition back to their PMOS whereas Marine Corps 
officers are expected to return to their PMOS following a standard three-year tour in 
contracting. The Army accession pipeline for contracting was concisely summarized by 
Marine Captain Justin Eastman (2016) in his research paper for Expeditionary Warfare 
School: 
The Army has a more effective model that allows their officers to 
specialize in functional areas. Every quarter the Army publishes a VTIP 
[Voluntary Transfer Incentive Program] In/Out chart that shows by 
commissioning year group what branches are allowing officers out and 
what specialized functional areas are allowing officers in. Army officers 
that move into functional specialized areas are allowed to remain in those 
MOSs for the duration of their career, if they desire, without being viewed 
as detrimental to career progression through O-5. The only negative 
impact that an Army officer may incur is that it will be more difficult for 
them to receive command at the O-5 level, particularly if their functional 
area has little correlation to their original branch. An example of this 
would be if a signals officer moved into an acquisition functional  
area. (p. 5) 
The Voluntary Transfer Incentive Program (VTIP) is the avenue from which 
Army officers can transfer to a branch or functional area, such as contracting, from a 
PMOS. According to the Officer Personnel Management Directorate the general 
eligibility criteria for Army active duty officers to enter the contracting functional area 
include: 
• Minimum grade of 1LT(P) 
• Graduate of the Captains Career Course (or enrolled in the Captains 
Career Course) 
• Successful completion of the appropriate key/developmental position in 
the grade of CPT (HRC, 2016) 
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Army officers entering the contracting field receive their entry-level training via 
the Army Acquisition Basic Course at the University of Alabama, Huntsville. This five-
week course provides DAWIA Level I training in program management and contracting 
by covering “the legal and regulatory policies and objectives that shape the acquisition 
process and the implementation of these policies and objectives by the U.S. Army” 
(Gambles, Johnson, & Jones, 2009, p. 26). This five week entry-level training in DAWIA 
Level I provided to Army officers varies significantly from the training provided to 
Marine Corps officers who are sent to NPS for 18–24 months to receive equivalencies for 
DAWIA Level I, II, and III contracting certification. 
The United States Army Acquisition Support Center (USAASC) oversees the 
entrance criteria for officers seeking a career in contracting and acquisitions, and “serves 
as the Proponent of Military Functional Area 51-Acquisition [the Army Acquisition 
Corps]” (Army Human Resource Command, 2016, p. 1). Additionally, “the FA51 
proponency will assess and submit reclassification actions through the U.S. Army Human 
Resources Command Reclassification Branch using the “Whole Soldier Concept” 
(Gambles, Johnson, & Jones, 2009, p. 26). The USAASC also monitors officer skill 
progression by rank through use of a career development path similar to Table 7. 
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Table 7.   Army Contracting Officer Career Roadmap. 
Source: Gambles, Johnson and Jones (2014). 
 
 
As cited above, the career development track for officer’s in Army contracting 
follows a path from functional experience, to broadening experience, up to strategic 
experience. This career path is not so different from the Air Force model previously 
discussed whose career development track is titled tactical, operational, and strategic. 
Both the Army and Air Force have built in a strategic level of contracting into their career 
paths to maintain proponency and functional advocacy for their contracting communities 
at the senior officer level of their service component. As previously mentioned, the 
Marine Corps does not possess a strategic level career path for contracting as the current 
senior ranking CCF officer is a lieutenant colonel, although structure exists for a single 
O-6, Colonel billet. 
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d. Commissioned Officers in Navy Contracting 
Naval officers that work in the contracting field come from the Navy Supply 
Corps or the Civil and Engineering Corps. Officers entering the field from the Supply 
Corps are geared towards contracting for supplies and services as opposed to construction 
contracting which is a specialty of the Civil and Engineering Corps. The focus of this 
research is on those naval officers that enter the contracting field through the Supply 
Corps, as this focus area more closely resembles contracting in the Marine Corps and the 
models previously discussed for the Air Force and Army.  
Naval officers interested in pursuing a career path in contracting are encouraged 
to complete the required DAU training classes while still serving in a Supply Corps billet. 
The Navy Supply Corps Playbook states the following: 
A junior officer’s exposure to contracts will extend throughout their career 
regardless of the subspecialty they choose. For those seeking to become 
experts in contracting, a clearly defined series of milestones are 
fundamental to achieving required Defense Acquisition Workforce 
[certification]. Ensigns through Lieutenants should seek DAWIA 
Contracting Level II certification when possible. (DON, 2011) 
Interested officers can apply to enter a Navy internship program for contracting at 
the grade of O-2 and O-3 under the Navy Acquisition Contracting Officer internship 
program following their initial sea duty. Once these naval officers are accepted into the 
internship program they have two years to complete their DAWIA level II training 
courses via DAU courses taken online and through resident classes. These officers will 
work OJT at an installation or systems contracting activity such as a Fleet Logistics 
Center, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), or Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command (SPAWAR) gaining exposure to a variety of contracting functions ranging 
from contract solicitation, negotiation, and award. The ultimate goal of naval officers 
interested in pursuing a career path in contracting is to enter the Navy Acquisition Corps. 
The Navy Acquisition Corps is the career path for officers to gain contracting 
experience across a variety of disciplines, and it is the pathway to support MDAPs 
similar to the Air Force protocols for intermediate level contracting experience 
previously discussed. The procedure for entering the acquisition workforce follows an 
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annual selection board process. According to the Navy Supply Corps Playbook section 
titled It’s Your Board, 
After completing at least Level II certification in a career field and 
meeting the four-year experience requirement, you are ready to apply for 
Acquisition Corps membership through the annual selection board 
process, which convenes each October to select officers into the Corps. 
Many Navy officer communities are eligible to join the Acquisition Corps. 
A NAVADMIN is released announcing the board which details the 
specifics of the application process. (DON, 2011) 
Table 8 lists a possible career path for Naval Officers to gain PMOS experience 
coupled with Acquisition experience to enter the Navy Acquisition Corps. 
Table 8.   Navy Contracting Officer Career Path.  
Source: Secretary of the Navy (2016b). 
 
 
Similar to the established protocols for Marine Corps officers, naval officers 
serving in contracting are transient in nature. An officer in the Supply Corps will often 
bounce between a billet in the Supply Corps and a billet in the Acquisition Corps at their 
normal rotation time. These officers are expected to maintain their PMOS proficiency 
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and contracting proficiency similar to officers serving in the Marine Corps contracting 
community. 
The protocols governing the entrance criteria into the contracting field for naval 
officers most closely resembles the established Marine Corps protocols since both 
services seek second tour officers; however, the training and development to groom these 
officers into successful contributors in the contracting workforce is in stark contrast. The 
Navy offers an internship program for its officers to enter the contracting field at an 
installation type contracting activity, working through an OJT period while 
simultaneously completing DAU training classes at the grades of O-2 and O-3. In 
comparison, the Marine Corps assigns its officers to a 18–24 month graduate program at 
NPS to earn DAU equivalencies up to DAWIA level III and upon graduation these 
officers are then assigned to an installation type contracting activity for a one year period 
of OJT. 
The Navy offers an acquisition career path in the contracting discipline that is not 
currently established in the Marine Corps. The current Marine Corps acquisition career 
path is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  Marine Corps Acquisition Career Path. 
Source: Secretary of the Navy (2016a). 
 
 
The 8059, Aviation Acquisition Management Professional (DON, 2015a) is a 
PMOS for Marine officers, as modeled in the Acquisition Professional Consolidated 
Career Path in Figure 3. Entrance into the 8059 PMOS (or 8061 PMOS, Ground 
Acquisition Management Professional (DON, 2015a))) is a permanent transition as 
opposed to the 3006 AMOS that is transient in nature. Marine officers entering a career in 
acquisitions are unlikely to return to the CCF since their career in acquisitions will take 
priority to the AMOS of 3006. In Comparison, naval officers can pursue an acquisition 
career path in the contracting discipline and continue to perform contracting functions. 
Similar protocols are established for the Air Force and Army contracting communities 
that have built in MDAP contracting support within the career roadmaps for officers 
serving in contracting. 
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3. Platforms 
KOs are required to learn a myriad of electronic systems to perform their duties. 
As existing legacy systems make efforts to remain relevant by upgrading system 
operations and increasing efficiencies, new systems are created in an attempt to 
modernize and replace legacy systems. The result is a fluid environment where processes 
on existing platforms change continuously and the existing platforms are always on the 
brink of replacement. This fluidity requires regular training and instruction in order to 
maintain proficiency and incorporate software and platform changes into standard 
operating procedures. An officer’s absence from the contracting field may require 
learning an entire new suite of systems, and their interfaces, from what was originally 
learned during their first tour. Both the DOD and the Marine Corps have programs in 
place to ensure that Marines in contracting billets are accurately trained on a platform’s 
usage; however, neither program provides a solution to counter skills atrophy when 
Marines are serving in their PMOS. 
a. System Access and Required Proficiency 
For the purpose of analysis, this report separates platforms as procurements 
systems and support systems. Procurement systems are those that generate Standard Form 
(SF)1449 or SF44 contracting documents. The SF1449 is the document used to generate 
uniform contract format for establishing government contracts with vendors above the 
micro-purchase threshold. SF44s are used to write contracts under the micro-purchase 
threshold. For the purpose of this analysis procurement systems include Procurement 
Desktop-Defense (PD2), Contingency PD2, 3 in 1 tool, and oContrax. Support systems 
are those that do not generate contracts, but still play a vital role in the procurement 
process, they include Invoice, Receipt, Acceptance, and Property Transfer (iRAPT) and 
PR Builder. APEX will be addressed separately in this section as it is a planning system 
rather than a procurement or support system. This analysis will focus on the ease with 
which each system can be learned. A brief description of each system will be presented to 
aid the reader’s understanding of the multitude of platforms that CCF officers must gain 
proficiency in to be an effective KO. This analysis focuses on the complexity of learning 
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and using each system. The narrow focus on each system should reveal the impact the 
systems have on transient officers and their knowledge base. 
(1) Procurement Systems 
Procurement systems in current use fall under the Standard Procurement System 
(SPS) architecture and include PD2 and Contingency PD2. Both systems are used across 
all services. Although not part of the SPS, the 3in1 Tool is an additional procurement 
system used by the DOD in place of the SF44, and is capable of interfacing with 
supporting systems. Additionally, the Marine Corps and Air Force are testing another 
procurement system called oContrax, which is currently under development and testing. 
• PD2 
All KOs must be proficient with using PD2 to effectively and efficiently execute 
their contracting duties, and continuous system updates demand the KO’s attention to 
learn new system functionalities. PD2 is the software system of the SPS. It provides an 
enterprise-wide contracting software solution to the DOD assisting in all functions from 
defining requirements to contract closeout. The system incorporates both client/server 
and Web technologies. Client/server capabilities allow work load management, file 
sharing, and storage solutions to the local contracting activities. The Web technologies 
enables information interface with PR Builder, solicitation interface with Federal 
Business Opportunities (fedbizops.gov), and Contract Action Report (CAR) generation 
and release. Of note, the SPS provided a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software 
solution designed to replace over 70 legacy systems (CACI, 2011). PD2 is the system that 
sets the foundation for OJT, but despite the intent for PD2 to be a consolidated, intuitive 
system, incorporating the various complexities from so many legacy systems into a 
COTS system created a complex and complicated enterprise for users to manipulate. 
Learning to use PD2 requires a slow methodical approach to learning coupled with 
repetition to assist retention. Even experienced users find themselves seeking help or 
using a trial and error method of rediscovery when performing uncommon actions. PD2 
also undergoes frequent updates to keep aligned with current acquisition regulations. 
Though most changes are in content rather than procedure, procedural changes often 
cause delays in certain steps of the contract development and management process. 
 72 
PD2 carries a unique complication regarding user proficiency for Marines. Once 
removed from the installation contracting office, there is very little opportunity for the 
Marine to use the software. ECPs do not have contract authority in a garrison 
environment; therefore, they do not warrant PD2 access while in garrison. To provide 
PD2 access, the Marine Corps would have to obtain licenses for each system identified to 
carry the software at the ECP, and the ECP would have to have local servers installed for 
the client/server interface to function. Such an installation would carry an extremely high 
initial cost creating a server room, purchasing server hardware, and including installation 
costs. It would also create a perpetual licensing cost each year. The lack of system access 
amplifies the challenges in maintaining proficiency on a complex computer system. Once 
OJT is complete, the next time an officer will gain access to PD2 is not until they are 
deployed or on an exercise executing contracts as a warranted KO. The same is true for 
officers returning to contracting after a tour in their PMOS. In this situation, there is even 
more opportunity for error as the returning officer does not have the benefit of conducting 
OJT shortly before executing contracts, and no reintegration period of training exists for 
returning officers. 
The most sensible solution to this capability gap is to increase the user’s access to 
PD2 when not deployed. Even having scenario-based training software would allow 
Marines to train in the PD2 environment without the requirement of a local server, 
allowing users to maintain a level of proficiency outside of the installation contracting 
office. It would also enable activities to create a reintegration training for officers 
returning from tours within their PMOS using current simulations of PD2. The cost of 
this course of action is unknown due to the development costs associated with the 
training software and licensing or purchasing agreements that would accompany it; 
however, this is beyond the scope of this research to explore. 
• Contingency PD2 
Similar to PD2, all KOs must be proficient with using Contingency PD2 to 
effectively and efficiently execute their contracting duties. The Contingency PD2, also 
known as PD2 Standalone, is an offline version that provides all the PD2 contract writing 
features for use in an austere environment. The procedural concept is that a Marine, prior 
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to deploying, would have the PD2 Standalone system loaded onto a deployable computer 
and updated with all current regulations, including provisions and clauses. This provides 
the Marine with a familiar contract writing system from which to generate SF1449s. 
Contingency PD2’s weakness is a lack of Web based interface like that used in PD2. 
Without this interface, there is no ability to pull data from the PR or to create or generate 
a CAR. 
Familiarity with PD2 Standalone system functionality is limited to the user’s 
previous experience with PD2. Familiarity is also influenced by the time spent away from 
the SE before deploying, which can be years for officers returning for a subsequent tour. 
Currently, in the newly established ECPs, PD2 Standalone has only been installed on a 
limited number of computer assets. PD2 Standalone does present an alternative course of 
action for overall SPS training and maintenance of skills proficiency; however due to 
high deployment tempos and limited computer resources the use of PD2 Standalone as a 
training option is not yet viable. Due to system update requirements and licensing rights, 
the cost of putting the system on ECP computers to be utilized for training is too costly. 
While the latest regulations may not be an absolute requirement for training purposes, the 
licensing costs for updates are charged per processor on each computer resulting in 
greater costs than the potential education benefit. 
• 3in1 Tool 
Marines assigned to joint contacting activities may use the 3in1 Tool to perform 
their contracting mission; therefore, they must be trained on its usage. The 3in1 Tool 
provides the KO with an alternative to utilizing paper SF44s for payments under the 
micro-purchase threshold. This can be particularly useful in an austere environment 
where weather can play a significant factor in operations. The 3in1 Tool is a portable, 
standalone device that enables data population into fields that mirror the SF44. On and 
off-line capabilities position the 3in1 Tool to serve as a complete replacement for paper 
SF44s. The 3in1 Tool is an example of a platform that is widely used throughout the 
DOD in a contingency or expeditionary environment, but is not currently used by the 
Marine Corps due to policy restrictions. Though the Marine Corps does not authorize the 
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3in1 Tool’s use, Marines can expect to use it if serving in a contracting capacity under 
another service’s contracting authority. 
• oContrax 
oContrax is an Internet-based system currently being field tested by KOs within I 
MEF as an alternative to Contingency PD2.  oContrax serves as an example of the types 
of systems that are being introduced to the contracting field while Marine officers serve 
outside of the CCF. Systems such as oContrax must be learned by the officer upon their 
return to the CCF to effectively and efficiently perform a contracting mission. The Air 
Force was the first to look at the system as a possible alternative to using PD2 
Standalone, and at the time of this research, the Air Force and Marine Corps are the only 
two services considering use of the system. 
oContrax is presented as requiring no system specific training to be effectively 
utilized in a deployed environment. A system not requiring formalized training for 
successful operation would provide significant advantages in reducing learning curve 
reset over the complexities of using PD2 Standalone. Though oContrax is an Internet-
based system, it does not synchronize with support systems. Additionally, the Internet 
connectivity requirement raises the question of its benefit in regard to deployable 
procurement systems.  oContrax does not eliminate the requirement to learn complex SPS 
systems, rather it provides an efficient easy alternative when Internet connectivity exists. 
Beyond ease of use, there is no tangible benefit which oContrax provides not already 
provided by Contingency PD2. 
(2) Support Systems 
This research limits the discussion and analysis of support systems to iRAPT e-
Business Suite applications and PR Builder. Though there are several more support 
systems, these are the two platforms that KOs are expected to maintain accounts with and 
access in contract execution. Additionally, customers are often required to learn a portion 
of the system’s usage; this is the case with Marine Corps supply and comptroller shops 




iRAPT is the post-award contract management tool that is mandated within the 
DOD, and all KOs must be familiar with its use. Becoming familiar with its use can be a 
daunting task because iRAPT includes an extensive suite of sub-systems as follows: 
myInvoice, Contracting Officer Representative Tool (CORT), Unique Identification 
Registry, Electronic Document Access (EDA), and Electronic Military Interdepartmental 
Purchase Request (eMIPR) (iRAPT Overview, n.d.). Though each tool within iRAPT has 
like roles and similar interface, the uses and function of each remains unique. As a 
support system, iRAPT access is not required to write contracts; however, contracting 
personnel must maintain high user proficiency to execute portions of their duties. 
• PR Builder 
In the performance of contracting duties, KOs must be able to lead their supported 
customers in the usage of PR Builder to input their requirements packages, linking the 
requirement with approved funding. The KO often serves as the connecting link between 
the customer and the comptroller for appropriate execution of government spending. PR 
Builder is an Internet-based platform that interfaces with PD2 and the Standard 
Accounting, Budgeting, and Reporting System (SABRS). In an operational environment, 
the KO screens customer PRs ensuring their customer clearly articulates their 
requirement. It is critical that the KO ensures the supported command understands the PR 
Builder interface due to its integral role in the contracting process; therefore, it is 
incumbent upon the KO to be fully proficient in PR Builder usage. 
(3) APEX 
Experienced, well-qualified CCF officers are required to provide OCS advisement 
to the GCC in support of joint operation mission requirements. This advisement is 
conducted through the development of an Annex W inside of the APEX system that 
details the anticipated OCS plan for the GCC (CJCS, 2014). Due to this requirement, 
3006s must maintain a certain level of understanding to effectively and efficiently 
provide OCS functions to the supported GCC. The majority of CCF actions are outside of 
joint operations; however, the MARFOR or MEF billets have a high potential to support 
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joint operations. Table 2 reflects one vacant MARFOR billet, one vacant MEF billet, and 
one MEF billet filled by a captain; therefore, it is a realistic consideration that 
inexperienced CCF officers may be called upon to perform in a joint capacity. The 
current understaffing in the CCF requires all 3006 Marines to have a heightened 
understanding of the APEX system. The current entry level training structure for 3006 
Marines is centered on the tactical level of contract administration and gives little 
attention to strategic operational planning. This gap in training, coupled with officer 
shortfalls, suggests that the current CCF officer corps capabilities do not possess 
adequate experience and training to support the GCC in OCS functions in joint operation 
environments. 
(4) Platforms Implications on the CCF Officer Corps 
Learning the multitude of procurement and support systems proves challenging 
for officers entering the contracting field. Removing the officer from the field in order to 
perform in their PMOS creates a requirement for the officer to re-familiarize themselves 
with the previously learned systems, and all new updates. The level of difficulty in 
relearning platforms when returning to contracting for subsequent tours is dependent on 
the intuitiveness of the platform. The burden of relearning systems becomes moot if CCF 
officers were permanently assigned to the MOS. The only remaining challenge would be 
to maintain proficiency with updates and changes as they take place. An alternate course 
of action other than making 3006 a PMOS is to create a requirement for officers 
possessing the 3006 AMOS to maintain proficiency on contracting systems while not 
assigned to contracting billets. Analyzing the CLP and training and readiness standards 
programs should help to determine the feasibility of incorporating a mandate to maintain 
system proficiency while 3006 Marines are serving in their PMOS. 
b. Continuous Learning Points to Maintain Certification Levels 
This section reviews the DOD CLP program to determine the impact on the CCF 
officer corps when 3006s are serving outside of CCF billets. DAWIA was enacted by 
Public Law 101-510 in 1990 as a means of improving the acquisition workforce. Once 
enacted, DAWIA established the DAU (Rendon & Snider, 2008, p. 269). The DAU’s 
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mission is to “provide a global learning environment to develop qualified acquisition, 
requirements and contingency professionals who deliver and sustain effective affordable 
warfighting capabilities (About DAU, n.d., p. 1).”  The OUSD AT&L issued Department 
of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.66, implementing the AT&L Workforce Education, 
Training, and Career Development Program. As such, the DoDI establishes the authority 
and responsibility of the acquisition workforce. It also established education requirements 
as they apply to certification. Part of the established education requirement for all AT&L 
workforce members is to maintain 80 CLPs every two years with a goal of 40 CLPs every 
fiscal year (DOD, 2005). DAU is the primary vehicle that provides guidance and 
opportunity for CLPs. CLPs can be earned through four mediums: training activities, 
educational activities, experience, and professional activities (Continuous Learning 
Center, n.d.). The subjects studied while earning CLPs are at the discretion of the AT&L 
worker or unit policy. As previously discussed, the draft MCO directs CCF Officers to 
rotate between 3006 and 3002 billet assignments (DON, in press). Currently there is no 
order or policy mandating that officers maintain CLP levels when not assigned to AT&L 
positions (CCF billets). AT&L regulations and policy are normally in flux making it 
difficult to stay abreast of current practices despite the CLP requirement. This challenge 
is amplified when removing an officer from the contracting field for periods three years 
or longer. With no requirement or incentive for CCF officers to maintain CLP levels 
while not in CCF billets, an even greater learning curve reset is created. 
As validated by the survey data, there is currently no reintegration process for 
returning CCF Officers. This imposes great pressure on 3006s to obtain the CLPs as 
swiftly as possible to either deploy or fully act in their billet capacity. Such pressure 
directs the CCF officer’s focus toward becoming qualified instead of re-familiarizing 
themselves with the field and learning the new regulations, systems, and procedures put 
in place in their absence. CLPs are not sufficient and specific enough for the returning 
officer to regain the proficiency required to perform their billet. There are two potential 
courses of action that may mitigate the knowledge atrophy: 1) setting a CLP requirement 
for CCF Officers while they are serving outside the AT&L community; and 2) making 
the 3006 a permanent MOS. Making a requirement for maintaining CLPs while operating 
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outside of AT&L billets will help CCF Officers maintain a level of proficiency while 
serving in PMOS billets. In order for this to be effective though, greater guidance would 
have to be provided so that the CLP training was specifically targeted toward reducing 
skill atrophy and keeping the officer abreast of current policy and regulation change. 
Training focused on maintaining proficiency could be selected by HQMC, LPC from 
existing DAU courses. Additionally, regulation and policy training would have to be 
developed and mandated by HQMC, LPC. Despite the potential effectiveness of this 
training, there is no true enforcement mechanism unless training completion is required 
as a documented part of an officer’s performance evaluation while serving in their PMOS 
billet. This enforcement would be highly unlikely, as the officer is serving other 
command requirements in their PMOS that will take precedence over their 3006 AMOS 
background, especially considering they may never return to contracting. As another 
potential recommendation, making CCF officers a PMOS would eliminate the need for 
any new training development beyond the current CLP program. 
c. Training and Readiness Events to Maintain Fully Trained Marines 
The systems approach to training (SAT) provides a six-phase structure for the 
Marine Corps to ensure Marines receive the proper training for their rank and billet, they 
receive the training at sufficient intervals, and they demonstrate skill mastery before 
advancing in task difficulty. Tasks are identified as either individual skills or collective 
skills; collective skills being those performed as a team such as a squad or platoon (DON, 
2010). As part of the SAT process, the Marine Corps publishes T&R Manuals for all 
MOSs. T&R standards for contracting Marines are found in the Ground Supply T&R 
Manual, NAVMC 3500.64B. The Contracting coded tasks include 14 individual tasks 
(see Table 9) divided into five functional/duty areas: Advanced Contracting Specialist 
(ADV), Contracting Specialist (COS), Expeditionary (EXPD), Intermediate Contracting 
Specialist (ICOS), and Management (MNMT) (DON, 2014). 
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Table 9.   Index of Individual Events.  
Source: NAVMC 3500.64B, p. 6-3. 
 
 
Unlike T&R events for most MOSs, many of the individual events for contracting 
are ambiguous. The individual events avoid specifying the automated system to use and 
the amount of the dollar threshold to operate within. This ambiguity allows for changes to 
occur within contracting regulations and requirements without having to edit the Ground 
Supply T&R Manual as well. Rather than requiring experience in specific FAR Parts, the 
T&R uses the words “when applicable.”  As contracting requirements are created from 
the needs of the customers, and each have their own unique circumstances; therefore, by 
not requiring T&R standard performance within a specific FAR Part, the CCF Marine is 
not pressured into using a specific FAR Part that would not be the best choice for 
procurement of the requirement. 
The ambiguity of the T&R Manual also carries negative consequences. Figure 4 
depicts individual event CONT-ADV-2001. The first notable discrepancy is the event 
code. Most MOS event codes are directed at specific billets such as a basic rifleman. 
There is not a T/O billet for Advance Contracting Specialists in the CCF; therefore, aside 
from rank, there is no means for the Marine to determine if the training event applies to 
them. Secondly, the actual performance steps are overly vague, describing basic 
responsibilities of any contracting supervisor rather than being reserved as an advanced 
responsibility. To further articulate this point, notice the grades range from staff sergeant 
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through lieutenant colonel. This suggests the only grade exempt from Advanced 
Contracting Specialist requirements is sergeant, the lowest entry grade allowed into the 
CCF. Further ambiguity exists in the event titles themselves. Both of the event titles for 
the Intermediate Contracting Specialist are also found within the Advanced Contracting 
Specialist events; however, the conditions and performance steps are different and reflect 
a natural progression in contracting knowledge and responsibility. These disparities do 
not suggest that the T&R program is inapplicable to Marines in contracting, rather they 
suggest that the current T&R standards for Marines in contracting should be rewritten 
and updated to be billet specific and reflect the changes enacted by the draft order when it 
goes into effect. 
Figure 4.  Individual Standard CONT-ADV-2001. 





The challenge of enforcing the CLP requirement among 3006s serving in their 
PMOS also exists regarding T&R standards. Not only would it be unrealistic to require 
3006s to perform contracting T&R standards while serving in their PMOS, it is counter to 
the T&R program. Billet specific T&R standards are written as such because they are 
only required for those billet holders to complete; therefore, a 3006 would not expect to 
be evaluated on the contracting T&R standards while in their PMOS.  
This analysis reveals contracting T&R standards as vague and unenforceable.    
To resolve the ambiguity, such standards must be rewritten as billet-specific standards 
that incorporate changes from the draft order. Regarding enforceability, there is no 
apparent means to require 3006s to maintain and perform T&R standards while serving in 
their PMOS. The only potential resolution appears to be creating a 3006 PMOS. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter V analyzed problems within the 3006 MOS by transitioning from a 
macro to a micro perspective. At the macro level, it assessed the relationship between 
DOD contingency contracting and the CCF’s critical vulnerabilities. The data analyzed 
revealed that the CCF is currently experiencing several of the challenges present within 
DOD contingency contracting. Despite similarities, the DOD IG recommendations for 
DOD contingency contracting operations did not appear to be appropriate for CCF 
inclusion as they were not linked to defined critical vulnerabilities identified in this 
research. An analysis of the 3006 T/O was conducted to assess the health of the overall 
force and reveal underlying causes to critical vulnerabilities. The analysis not only 
revealed the Marine Corps’ inability to adequately staff billets, but it also highlighted the 
experience gap present by filling field grade billets with entry-level officers. Billet 
vacancies caused entry-level officers to staff senior billets and key leadership billets left 
vacant. The survey results were then analyzed to reveal Marine Corps contracting 
leadership’s perception of transient 3006s and identify potential courses of action that 
may address the vulnerabilities. Finally, the TIPS Model was utilized to assess the health 
of the CCF. Analysis of the personnel pillar revealed numerous gaps in mission readiness 
caused by inadequate structure and policy. Protocol pillar analysis compared the Marine 
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Corps contracting program with adjacent services to identify potential models that could 
be incorporated into the Marine Corps. The platform pillar analysis revealed the plethora 
of contracting system knowledge requirements and that the mechanisms in place to 
maintain proficiency in contracting are not enforceable when a 3006 Marine returns to 
their PMOS. 
The combined discussions and analysis has identified multiple gaps in capability 
that cannot be filled through any one specific course of action. The next chapter reveals 
the researches recommendations and conclusions that address the CCF’s critical 
vulnerabilities discovered herein. 
  
 83 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusion of this report presents the top five recommendations for the 
Marine Corps CCF obtained from completing the research objective. Each 
recommendation includes a justification paragraph that documents the perceived benefit 
to the Marine Corps CCF from implementing the proposed change. The overarching goal 
of all recommendations is to establish a more effective contracting workforce to better 
enable the CCF to efficiently execute mission requirements. After the top five 
recommendations of the report are presented, two areas of future research are presented 
in the section that follows. These two areas of future research potentially have significant 
impacts on the CCF’s ability to efficiently execute its mission, but investigation of these 
two areas is beyond the scope of this research. Finally, this chapter concludes with a brief 
review of the research objective and the methodology utilized to complete this research. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The research conducted in furtherance of the objective yielded five 
recommendations regarding the employment of officers in the CCF. These 
recommendations were introduced as potential considerations within the data and 
discussions and analysis portions of this research, and they are formalized in this chapter. 








Table 10.   Research Recommendations 
1. Create a Shortened Entry-Level Training Program For Officers – Not an 18–24 
Month Master’s Degree Program. 
2. Reserve the NPS Contracting Program for Field Grade Officers Returning for a 
Subsequent 3006 Tour. 
3. Make Contracting a PMOS for Second Tour Field Grade Officers, Linking this 
Milestone to a Formal 3006 Career Progression Roadmap, and Allow Other MOS 
Communities to Enter the CCF. 
4. Adopt a Deputy to Head of Contingency Contracting as an O-6 or O-7 Billet to be 
Filled by a 3006. 
5. Establish a Reintegration Training Period for Officers Returning to Contracting for 
Subsequent Tours. 
 
1. Create a Shortened Entry-Level Training Program For Officers—Not 
an 18- to 24-Month Master’s Degree Program 
The primary research objective of identifying potential critical vulnerabilities to 
the CCF officer corps brought to light the excessive and inappropriate entry level training 
program for new CCF officers. NPS provides an excellent opportunity for Marine 
officers to advance their careers by obtaining graduate degrees in highly specialized 
fields; however, for those officers just entering the CCF, an 18–24 month NPS program 
greatly delays their first exposure to touching a contract action. The NPS resident 
program removes any chance for entry-level officers to gain relevant hands-on 
experience managing contracts until they arrive at their first RCO to initiate OJT. 
Additionally, much of the material instructed at NPS is catered to MDAPs, which has 
little relevance in Marine Corps field, contingency contracting activities. For example, 
nearly all contract actions at RCOs and in support of forward deployed Marines utilize 
simplified acquisition procedures for procurement of commercial item solutions, and the 
vast majority of those actions are under the simplified acquisition threshold. 
 85 
The NPS curriculum for contract management provides the fundamental concepts 
behind the theoretical framework for contracting with particular emphasis on contracting 
for commercial items; however, the NPS curriculum lacks the specific procedural 
instructions to guide a new officer in awarding contracts. This gap in training at NPS 
exists because the program is targeted at Contracting Series, General Schedule-1102s 
who have already completed DAWIA Level I contracting certification requirements. 
Based on the lack of procedural instruction, a recommendation is  for the Marine Corps to 
establish a shortened entry-level training school for officers that focuses on DAU Level I 
competencies similar to the Air Force and Army 4–6 week introductory training period 
followed by immediate assignment to a field contracting activity. This model would 
immerse the officer in a contracting environment at a far more rapid tempo compared to 
the NPS program, benefiting both the individual officer and the Marine Corps through 
increased gains in experience and immediate increases to manpower strength yielding 
improved contract action completion rates. 
2. Reserve the NPS Contracting Program for Field Grade Officers 
Returning for a Subsequent 3006 Tour 
The three focus areas of this report’s research objective included training, career 
path, and manpower shortfalls. This second recommendation offers a direct means of 
addressing the training and career path critical vulnerabilities identified in this report, and 
if implemented in conjunction with the third recommendation will greatly reduce 
manpower shortfalls. The recommendation to reserve the NPS contracting program for 
field grade officers returning for a subsequent tour further cements a career progression 
roadmap for 3006s, incentivizing field grade officers to grow in the field, and it enables a 
segment of the 3006 community to focus on contracting at the operational and strategic 
levels. 
The Marine Corps should reserve the NPS contracting program for field grade 
officers focused on the operational and strategic levels of contracting. The NPS contract 
management curriculum teaches skills directly relevant to operational and strategic level 
OCS functions in contrast to the entry-level skills associated to awarding contracts 
previously discussed. These operational and strategic level contracting skills are geared 
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toward placing an officer on a GCC’s staff to provide OCS functions over the range of 
military operations in joint environments. These skills include policy management, 
establishing annexes for operational orders, and staffing acquisition requirements for 
contract execution in the GCC’s AOR. The staff equivalencies executing these functional 
area responsibilities are predominately populated by field grade officers. For this reason, 
the NPS contracting curriculum is better suited towards field grade officers preparing to 
serve in OCS advisory billets as a pathway into the operational and strategic levels of 
contracting. Also, offering NPS to field grade officers would further incentivize officers 
to return for a subsequent 3006 tour.   
This recommendation for field grade NPS attendance further supports the third 
recommendation of this research, which focuses on establishing a PMOS for officers 
returning for a second tour in contracting and linking this procedure into an overall career 
progression roadmap for CCF officers. The third recommendation also suggests 
considerations for appropriate feeder MOSs into the field of contracting. 
3. Make Contracting a PMOS for Second Tour Field Grade Officers, 
Linking this Milestone to a Formal 3006 Career Progression 
Roadmap, and Allow Other MOS Communities to Enter the CCF 
The central focus of this research involves restoring the health of the CCF officer 
corps. Significant field grade manpower shortfalls is arguably the single greatest problem 
area that currently plagues the CCF. Transitioning the 3006 field grade community to a 
PMOS would take significant strides to correct the inadequate field grade staffing. The 
Marine Corps will improve the quality and efficiency of contracting by making 3006 a 
PMOS for second tour officers. If the Marine Corps implemented this recommendation in 
conjunction with the previous two recommendations the health of the CCF field grade 
officer corps would be greatly improved. The CCF community has also expressed their 
desire to seek 3006 as a PMOS as documented in the survey results. 
From the data gathered in survey responses addressed in Chapter IV of this report, 
officer manpower shortfalls is easily the highest ranked critical vulnerability to the CCF, 
selected unanimously by all 21 survey participants. Additionally, 76 percent of survey 
participants found that impermanent officer assignment was another critical vulnerability 
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that affected mission readiness for contracting. This data supports the conclusion that 
impermanent officer assignment impairs the Marine Corps’ ability to efficiently perform 
its CCF mission. The unanimous survey response also supports this recommendation as 
there appears to be community interest in pursuing a permanent structure for officers in 
contracting. Additionally, several comments from senior members of the CCF share in 
this sentiment as expressed in remarks such as, “Bottom line: if the MC wants to really 
get serious about this career field, it needs a PMOS.” 
This research has determined the most effective method of establishing a PMOS 
in the CCF community is to introduce the PMOS lateral move option during an officer’s 
second tour in contracting. The research has also determined that entry-level officers are 
not appropriate for assignment to a 3006 PMOS because these officers need to 
demonstrate their aptitude and proficiency in contracting during their first tour. Despite 
this recommendation, the Marine Corps does not currently define an established career 
path for 3006s to shape their career progression; therefore, establishing a career 
progression roadmap would clearly define when a 3006 PMOS lateral move would occur 
in an officer’s career. An established career path would also serve to greatly improve the 
overall strength of the CCF officer corps by ensuring officers are assigned to appropriate 
billets at the right timing in their career progression. 
CCF officers would benefit significantly from a career progression roadmap 
similar to the Air Force model discussed in Chapter V that defines contracting experience 
and proficiency into tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The Air Force career 
progression model defines contracting at the tactical level as approximately 0–10 years of 
contracting experience, the operational level as approximately 10–20 years of contracting 
experience, and the strategic level as approximately 20 plus years of contracting 
experience. Using the Air Force model as a foundation, this research adopts their three 
levels of contracting experience into a proposed 3006 career progression roadmap as 
proposed in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.  Proposed CCF Officer Career Progression Roadmap 
 
 
Figure 5 details the career path for Marine officers in the CCF as they progress 
through the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of contracting. Progressing 
chronologically through the chart, the potential 3006 officer will be selected to enter into 
the CCF on the CCLEB following completion of a successful PMOS tour and career 
designation. This research recommends that upon CCLEB selection the officer is sent to 
the Air Force’s four-week Mission Ready Contracting Officer (MRC-102) Course for 
training and assignment in support of tactical level contracting. MRC-102 will provide 
the officer the fundamental knowledge to work in an entry-level contracting position, and 
the officer attains the 3006 AMOS designation. Upon MRC-102 graduation the research 
recommends assigning the newly qualified 3006 officer to a RCO for a one to two year 
OJT period. Upon demonstrating OJT competency and meeting IDP milestones the 
officer will be assigned to an ECP to support contingency contracting deployments, 
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operating at the tactical level. Upon completion of their first tour in the CCF the officer 
will return back to their PMOS. 
During the officer’s second tour in their PMOS, officers possessing the 3006 
AMOS will be screened on the Commandant’s Professional Intermediate-Level 
Education Board (CPIB) for formal education attendance under the SEP. This research 
recommends that CPIB board members review the tactical level contracting proficiency 
of each field grade officer possessing the 3006 AMOS, determining the most appropriate 
officers for selection to attend the NPS contract management curriculum. The NPS 
curriculum will effectively introduce selected officers to the operational and strategic 
levels of contracting. Upon NPS graduation, the field grade officer can be assigned to an 
ECP CCO billet; MEF or MARFOR OCS advisory billet; or to serve in an MDAP 
contracting office. During this assignment the officer will be evaluated for contracting 
proficiency at the operational and strategic levels. It is recommended that once each 
officer obtains 540 days of observed evaluation time in their second 3006 tour they 
become eligible for a 3006 PMOS lateral move. HQMC will conduct an annual screening 
and assessment board to select 3006 PMOS officers. Those officers wishing to be 
removed from consideration must notify HQMC prior to the annual accession board, and 
removal from consideration will be based on needs of the Marine Corps. Lateral move 
applications will be screened based upon the officer’s performance thus far when 
executing CCF billets, in addition to their performance while serving in their PMOS. 
Once designated a 3006 PMOS, the field grade officer is now a permanent member of the 
CCF and will no longer return back to tours in their former PMOS. With the 3006 PMOS, 
the officer is now eligible to serve in billets as an RCO Director; joint contracting tour 
billets; or to serve in a contracting office under a MDAP within the DOD. Serving as a 
contracting officer under a MDAP capitalizes on the Marine Corps’ intent to use the NPS 
education path to train CCF officers, since the NPS curriculum is heavily focused on 
contract actions associated to MDAPs. From this point on in an officer’s career in the 
CCF, the officer is available to serve in operational and strategic contracting level billets 
throughout the Marine Corps, with the potential to promote to the rank of Colonel or 
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Brigadier General serving in the Deputy to Head of Contingency Contracting billet which 
is presented in recommendation four. 
It is also important to note, by restricting entrance criteria eligibility to only 
supply officers the Marine Corps has limited the opportunities to obtain well-qualified 
officers from other MOSs that could provide valuable experience inputs to the CCF. 
Regardless if 3006 remains a PMOS or AMOS, the Marine Corps would benefit from 
introducing outside MOS communities other than supply into the CCF. Supply officers 
are prime candidates for contracting accession; however, supply is only one function in a 
much larger model that governs the contracting process. KOs also work closely with the 
finance and logistics communities to ensure the proper execution and expenditure of 
appropriated funds. The accession pipeline should be reopened to MOSs other than 
supply. 
Establishing a PMOS for officers returning for a second tour will serve to mitigate 
field grade manpower shortfalls, and increase the health of the CCF officer corps. 
Furthermore, a formal career progression roadmap will benefit the CCF through the 
retention of experienced, well-qualified officers, and also benefit the individual officer by 
defining clear milestones for them to grow in the ranks of the CCF officer corps. Opening 
entrance into the CCF to additional MOSs will expand the breadth of knowledge and 
experience within the CCF, enabling efficiencies in CCF mission accomplishment. 
Ultimately, this recommendation increases career growth opportunities for officers that 
desire to serve in the CCF. 
4. Adopt a Deputy to Head of Contingency Contracting as an O-6 or O-7 
Billet to be Filled by a 3006 
The primary research objective involves defining a link to the critical 
vulnerabilities that affect the CCF’s capability to efficiently execute its mission. As 
previously discussed, a lack of senior field grade officers in the CCF is arguably the 
single greatest problem area that currently plagues the CCF. One possible reason for a 
lack of field grade officer retention in the CCF is the limited opportunity for advancement 
within the 3006 community. 
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Under the current structure, no billets exist for an officer beyond the grade of O-5, 
thus an officer that is pursuing a career in the CCF has reached their terminal rank at this 
point in their career progression  The lack of advancement could serve as a method of 
dis-incentivizing well-qualified officers from entering or returning to the CCF. The lack 
of a senior billet also precludes CCF functional advocacy on Marine Corps’ Operational 
Advisory Groups and executive seminars where decisions are made that affect the overall 
force structure. Having a senior voice, that understands contracting, to represent the CCF 
at these working groups is of paramount importance to safeguard community interests 
and achieve the most effective and efficient use of CCF resources. Congress has realized 
the importance of ensuring a senior voice represents contracting interests by directing the 
DOD to assign a senior commissioned officer with contracting experience to each GCC. 
The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2007 
mandated “The assignment of a senior commissioned officer with appropriate acquisition 
experience and qualifications to act as head of contingency contracting during combat 
operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, who shall report directly 
to the commander of the combatant command in whose area of responsibility the 
operations occur” (Pub. L. 109-364, 2006, sec. 854). Based on this requirement, it is 
recommended the Marine Corps adopts a Deputy to Head of Contingency Contracting as 
a Colonel or Brigadier General billet, to be filled by a 3006. A senior commissioned 
officer, by law, is supposed to act as head of contingency contracting, which would 
justify the need for each service component to develop a deputy billet that serves to make 
liaison with the appointed head of contingency contracting with matters regarding the 
individual service components’ employment of its CCF manpower. The establishment of 
such a billet within the T/O structure would create an opportunity that would incentivize 
officers to desire to grow and promote within billets in the CCF. 
5. Establish a Reintegration Training Period for Officers Returning to 
Contracting for Subsequent Tours 
This recommendation addresses the research objective as it pertains to skills 
atrophy caused by transient officers moving back and forth between CCF billets and their 
PMOS. If the Marine Corps does not implement the previously introduced 
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recommendations, a possible alternative solution is to establish reintegration training. The 
acquisitions field is a fluid, rapidly changing environment that demands regular training 
to remain abreast of current regulations. The analysis determined that current training 
requirements are insufficient to address the knowledge lost through skills atrophy, nor do 
they address new regulations that come into effect when the officer is serving back in 
their PMOS. Without specifying required course subjects for KOs to attend, DAWIA’s 
CLP program lacks the focus required to reintegrate returning officers. These courses are 
designed for those currently working in the acquisition field, not for those returning to it 
after a three-year hiatus. Additionally, Marine Corps’ T&R standards are vague and are 
designed to assess a KO’s knowledge, not to systematically train Marines. There are two 
potential means of mitigating skills atrophy: 1) making 3006 a PMOS or 2) design and 
implement a reintegration training program inclusive of changes over a three-year span of 
time. Advocacy of a 3006 PMOS is identified as the most effective course of action as 
already detailed in recommendation three; therefore, this recommendation focuses on 
implementing a reintegration training program.   
Although not the most effective course of action, establishing a reintegration 
training program is the most feasible course of action to mitigate the critical vulnerability 
of skills atrophy. The effectiveness of a reintegration training program for returning 
3006s hinges upon the following three characteristics: the program must be incorporated 
agency-wide; the program must be established in policy by higher headquarters; and the 
curriculum must be centrally developed and managed to ensure that only up-to-date, 
relevant, and accurate information is included. HQMC LPC’s mission “is to provide 
policy, guidance and oversight for all ground supply and maintenance matters; to provide 
policy, guidance and oversight for logistics training and education” (USMC, 2016a, p. 1). 
As such, HQMC LPC is already responsible for providing policy and training to the CCF. 
LPC’s mission enables them to incorporate all three previously discussed characteristics 
needed for successful program implementation, making LPC the logical choice to 
implement a reintegration training program. Not only is LPC able to implement agency-
wide policy and training, but they are also able to enforce the reintegration training 
program’s execution. Furthermore, LPC’s existing role enables them to maintain 
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awareness on policy changes and training deficiencies in the CCF allowing LPC to tailor 
the training so that it is up-to-date and relevant. This research recommendation does not 
define a specific method for reintegration training as this is beyond the scope of this 
research; however, it is believed that a comprehensive reintegration training program 
managed and maintained by LPC is the most feasible solution to address skills atrophy if 
the Marine Corps elects not to adopt this researches’ previous recommendations. 
B. AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
Completing the research objective of this paper has resulted in two problem areas 
for future research, as follows: 1) does the DOD have the right number of qualified 
members in the acquisition work force to manage the defense acquisition system, and 2) 
what is the impact of civilian manpower staffing efforts on the CCF’s mission?  These 
two areas of consideration are beyond the scope of this research which focused on the 
effects of the transient officer in the CCF; however, both topics have potentially 
significant impacts on the CCF’s ability to efficiently execute its mission. This threat 
correlates to similar problems experienced in the civilian acquisition workforce within 
the DOD. Professors Rene Rendon and Keith Snider quote Senator Levin in their book 
Management of Defense Acquisition Projects, as saying, “The root cause of these and 
other problems in the defense acquisition system is our failure to maintain an acquisition 
work force with the resources and skills needed to manage the department’s acquisition 
system” (2008, p. 268). This quote expresses the significance of conducting additional 
research in these problem areas since they may have significant impacts on CCF mission 
efficiency. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this research effectively met the research objective. The objective 
of this research was to assess impacts of the CCF realignment relevant to the CCF officer 
corps, identifying potential critical vulnerabilities that exist under the new contracting 
structure employed by the Marine Corps, and to subsequently make recommendations for 
corrective actions to restore health to the CCF officer corps. The focus areas of interest 
were training, career path, and manpower deficiencies as there appears to be a link 
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between these areas of interest and an inability of the CCF to execute its mission 
efficiently. 
This research has examined the effects of transient officers in the CCF on the 
Marine Corps’ ability to effectively and efficiently provide contracting support to Marine 
Corps operations. This research effort began by defining the research objective, scope, 
and focus areas to assess the impacts of the CCF realignment on the CCF officer corps. 
Research included a comprehensive literature review of the directives, doctrine, and 
studies associated to CCF operations, implementation messages affecting the CCF 
realignment, and the draft MCO that governs CCF functions. Data was also accumulated 
from an analysis of the top five systemic contracting problem areas denoted by DOD IGO 
studies. This data helped to build a seven-question survey that was provided to the senior 
members of the CCF to better identify critical vulnerabilities and make recommendations 
for corrective actions. 
All data was analyzed under the TIPS Model personnel, protocol, and platform 
pillars, focusing on the CCF officer corps and the link to the effects of transient officers 
on the CCF’s ability to effectively and efficiently execute its mission. The personnel 
pillar analyzed the accession pipeline for the 3006 MOS to determine the current 
capability to meet operating force requirements. The protocol pillar analyzed the doctrine 
that establishes the entrance criteria for officers in the CCF within all service components 
and the impacts associated with transient officers serving in Marine Corps CCF billets. 
The platform pillar analyzed training requirements and technical proficiencies achieved 
by officers in a 3006 tour to determine the detriment to the CCF when transient officers 
are absent for three years or greater. Analysis under the TIPS model resulted in the five 
recommendations cited in Table 10. These recommendations focus on the training, 
development, and employment of officers serving in the CCF. 
In conclusion, all research findings and subsequent recommendations indicate that 
the Marine Corps could most benefit from transitioning field grade CCF officers to a 
PMOS. The data analyzed confirms the impetus for conducting this research effort, that 
impermanent officer assignment to contracting detriments the Marine Corps’ ability to 
efficiently perform its CCF mission. 
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APPENDIX A.  ADDITIONAL SURVEY COMMENTS 
The following are additional comments obtained at the end of survey respondent 
submissions. 
“Too many Officers believe they are above awarding contracts themselves. I have 
seen Captains jump through hoops to get warrants not to support the command 
but only to build a resume. I don’t understand why we would train Officers in 
Contracting only to send them back to a Supply Officer billet, this is the biggest 
mistake I believe the Marine Corps is making with our Officers.” 
“As a Marine, serving in the acquisition field our environment is rapidly changing 
in which, we (Marine Corps) need to make a hard invest or expand this field to 
support our Expeditionary roots. As you prepare your thesis can the 3006/3044 
MOSs be sustain for the future?  Our Marines are force multipliers in the 
acquisition field far better than the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Once your thesis 
is completed can you share it with the Marine Corps acquisition community? 
Lastly, SNCOs are the touch point to help in the process for OJT. Senior SNCOs 
are thinking on the strategic level and focusing on the overall concept of support.” 
“There currently is not a training curriculum that prepares Marine Contracting 
personnel for deployed contracting. This causes the experienced KOs to be tasked 
repeatedly with deployments. The only incentive currently to stay Marine vice 
moving on to the civilian sector is a devotion to the Corps itself. The addition of 
852 funds, NPS, and other programs has begun to move the field in the right 
direction for incentives; however, there is still a long way to go IOT keep Marines 
as active duty KOs.” 
“The lack of a permanent officer corps to include LDO/WO options is a great 
hindrance to the field in general. This places great stress on the enlisted Marines 
to bridge the gaps. Normally this would not be a concern, but the lack of enough 
enlisted Marines exasperates the situation.” 
“Both the retention issue needs to be addressed for both the enlisted and officers. 
However, I do not believe there are enough individuals who advocate for the 
career field. Many don’t fully understand the capability but know they need and 
want it so we to better educate our leadership.” 
“I don’t believe the questions here are clear in intent, so I responded to the best of 
my interpretation. When asked what role an officer ‘could’ have, I assume you 
mean what role they ‘should’ have. Currently, the MOS is so short, that any 
officer ‘could’ fill any role, regardless of qualification or suitability.” 
“I came into contracting to gain requisite education and experience to lat move 
into the Acquisition MOS and serve in a Program Management billet, but was 
denied that opportunity due to a combination of no senior leadership advocacy 
 96 
and domination by those that had prior assignments at NAVAIR/SYSCOM. 
Based on the mismanagement of key leadership billets among officer, enlisted, 
and Civil/SCS and lack of advocacy within the USMC Contracting community, I 
had no incentive to return to contracting after one payback tour.” 
“When I read the invitation I was hoping the survey, an analysis of transient 
officers in a rapidly changing acquisition environment, was going to shine a light 
on the three major issues impacting the 3006 MOS. Those being; 3006 is a 
secondary MOS, for over a decade we have not attended NPS, and LtCol is the 
highest rank attainable. I believe the questions IRT what roles could Capt/Maj/
LtCol should/could have are missing the mark, as their rank will dictate their 
billets and their capacity and there is very little reintegration (if any) because no 
matter what your MOS is we are all marines and our green-side training is the 
same for everyone. Are you in the Marine Corps or the Navy/Army/Air Force? 
Don’t take that as an insult; I ask because you have an opportunity to positively 
impact the 3006 MOS and your questions are more broad-brushed than definitive. 
I graduated NPS in 2003 and with the exception of a 2-year command tour I have 
been in the MOS and have seen it go from struggling to where we are now; 34 
billets with 14 gapped and 4 of 7 LtCol’s retiring by the end of next year. I could 
go into greater detail if you want to call. I can be reached at (redacted for 
privacy).” 
“The best solution is to make a primary MOS. NMOS is not enough. Could be a 
WO/CWO/LDO track or model it after the acquisition PMOS (lat[eral] move etc). 
Bottom line: if the MC wants to really get serious about this career field, it needs 
a PMOS.” 
“I would be interested in seeing the results of this survey.” 
“The CVs I selected were not necessarily documented, they were the CVs that I 
believed are present within the workforce.” 
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24 Sgt - 
LtCol
No To ensure purchase request complies 
with laws, regulations, policies, and 
authorized threshold IAW FAR.
1. Review purchase request.
2. Validate purchase request.
3. Conduct market research.
4. Perform Acquisition planning.
5. Determine method of procurement.
6. Prepare justification and approval, when applicable.
7. Prepare determination and findings, when applicable.
8. Conduct legal reviews, when applicable.




Conduct post solicitation 
actions
24 Sgt - 
LtCol
No To ensure purchase request complies 
with laws, regulations,
policies, and authorized threshold IAW 
FAR.
1. Determine social economic requirements.
2. Determine contract type.
3. Post contract requirements.
4. Review contract offers.
5. Establish competitive range.
6. Revise final offers.
7. Prepare abstract.
8. Prepare pre-award notices.
9. Prepare determination and findings, when applicable.
10. Prepare justification and approval, when applicable.




Conduct pre-award actions 24 Sgt - 
LtCol
No To ensure contract complies with laws, 
regulations, policies, and
authorized threshold IAW FAR.
1. Determine contract requirement(s).
2. Determine Contracting Officer Representative (COR) 
requirements, when applicable.
3. Prepare contract forms.
4. Obtain appropriate approval.





Conduct post award actions 24 Sgt - 
LtCol
No To ensure contract complies with laws, 
regulations, policies, and
authorized threshold IAW FAR.
1. Distribute contract.
2. Prepare contract actions report.
3. Issue contract actions report.
4. Conduct contract administration requirements.
5. Verify receipt of supplies/services.
6. Verify payment.
7. Conduct contract modifications, when applicable.
8. Conduct legal review, when applicable.
9. Issue delivery/task orders, when applicable.
10. Exercise options, when applicable.
11. Conduct Contracting Officer Representative (COR) audits, 
when applicable.
12. Conduct post award debrief, when applicable.
13. Conduct protest proceedings, when applicable.
14. Terminate/Cancel contract(s), when applicable.
15. Close contract.






12 SSgt - 
LtCol
No To ensure methodologies comply with 
laws, regulations, policies,
and authorized threshold.
1. Conduct pre/post solicitation reviews.
2. Review pre/post award actions.
3. Prepare pre-negotiation business clearance memorandums.
4. Conduct source selection procedures, when applicable.




9. Facilitate post award conferences.
10. Execute stop work order, when applicable.
11. Execute change request orders, when applicable.







12 GySgt - 
LtCol
No In order to establish ratification 
requirements.
1. Review requirements.
2. Forward ratification to legal.
3. Identify ratification, if applicable.
4. Finalize ratification.
5. Reject ratification, when applicable.
6. Issue contract.
7. Return rejected documents to legal/customer, when 
applicable.
8. Perform post award actions, when applicable.
3006 Training and Readiness Standards - NAVMC 3500.64B
3006 officers must achieve proficiency in all training events listed below.  SNCO 3044s must achieve proficiency in all training events listed below as well except for the CONT-
MNMT-2001.  
                  
COS - Contracting Specialist








24 Sgt - 
LtCol
No To ensure contract procedures are 
adhered IAW laws and regulations.
1. Assign task(s).
2. Review final documents.






24 Sgt - 
LtCol
No To ensure acquisition procedures are 
adhered to IAW laws and regulations.
1. Determine Acquisition requirements.
2. Review pre/post solicitation actions.
3. Review pre/post award actions.
4. Oversee Government Purchase Card (GPC) Program






24 Sgt - 
LtCol
No To facilitate contracting functions and 
capabilities across the range of military 
operations.
1. Determine contract requirements.
2. Conduct liaison.
3. Confirm resource availability.
4. Task organize.






Administer Field Ordering 
Officer (FOO) Program
24 Sgt - 
LtCol
No In order to provide micro purchase 
support to internal/external agencies.
1. Establish Program.










24 Sgt - 
LtCol
No To ensure methodologies comply with 
laws, regulations, policies, and 
authorized threshold.
1. Conduct pre/post solicitation reviews.
2. Review pre/post award actions.
3. Prepare pre-negotiation business clearance memorandums.
4. Conduct source selection procedures, when applicable.




9. Facilitate post award conferences.
10. Execute stop work order, when applicable.
11. Execute change request orders, when applicable.
12. Request equitable adjustments.
13. Execute claim.
14. Forward for legal review, when necessary.
15. Forward to higher headquarters, when necessary.






12 GySgt - 
LtCol
No To determine ratification eligibility IAW 
FAR.
1. Review requirements.
2. Identify ratification, if applicable.
3. Forward ratification to legal.
4. Finalize ratification.
5. Reject ratification, when applicable.
6. Issue contract.
7. Return rejected documents to legal/customer, when 
applicable.
8. Perform post award actions, when applicable.






12 GySgt - 
LtCol
No To provide operational contract support. 1. Review mission requirements.
2. Determine contracting support requirements.
3. Analyze internal/external contracting support sources.
4. Brief Commander.






12 Capt - 
LtCol
No To ensure contract procedures are 
adhered to IAW laws and
regulations.
1. Determine Acquisition requirements.
2. Validate pre/post solicitation actions.
3. Validate pre/post award actions.
4. Enforce plans, policies and procedures.
5. Conduct performance evaluation(s).
6. Review civilian selection process, when applicable.
7. Coordinate with higher headquarters, when required.
8. Coordinate with Human Resources, when applicable.
9. Supervise Government Purchase Card (GPC) Program.
10. Advise higher/adjacent headquarters.
11. Conduct internal audits.
ADV - Advanced Contracting Specialist
MNMT  - Management
EXPD - Expeditionary
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